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ABSTRACT 
 
NICOLE BALKIND: A Model Republic? Trust and Authoritarianism on Tatarstan's  
Road to Autonomy 
(Under the direction of Graeme Robertson) 
 
 Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, ethnic groups such as Tatars and Chechens 
began to demand independence. From the cacophony of autonomy demands, Tatarstan 
emerged with the highest level of autonomy of Russia’s 21 ethnic republics. This thesis 
argues that Tatarstan negotiated a relatively high amount of independence through elite 
trust and regional authoritarianism. The unique position of the Tatar leadership allowed 
them to maximize their autonomy by being seen as an ally of Moscow, having insider 
experience with the Russian legal system, and using President Shaimiev's 
authoritarianism as a bargaining chip. The control exercised by Shaimiev's regime was 
used to apply pressure to the federal authorities during a period when Moscow feared the 
unraveling of the fragile Russian Federation. Elite trust and regional authoritarianism 
acted upon each other to keep the balance of incentives for both Tatarstan and Russia and 
were thus integral to Tatarstan's path to autonomy.  
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"Write your injuries in dust, your benefits in marble." Benjamin Franklin 
 
To Brandon, who tolerates my dust and believes it will become marble. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 1767, Catherine the Great wrote to her consort Voltaire, "I am in Asia! I 
wanted to see this country with my own eyes. In Kazan, there are twenty different 
peoples which are nothing like each other and I have to sew, for them, one garment to 
suit everyone."1 Long has Russia been vexed by how to deal with the numerous diverse 
peoples who inhabit the edged of their empire. Catherine the Great's difficulty in finding 
a policy toward Russia's ethnic regions was also felt by the Soviet leadership and Russian 
Presidents since the end of the Soviet Union. The 21 ethnic republics are as diverse in 
their political character as they are in religion, language and appearance; creating a 
system of governance that is equitable and satisfactory to all has proven to be a great 
challenge.  
 As the Soviet Union unraveled, a cacophony of demands arose from Russia's 
ethnic regions. Moscow endeavored to negotiate different agreements as needed with 
each ethnic republic, oblast or krai. By the late 1990's, 47 individual agreements had been 
signed. Russia's foray into this unique arrangement of constituent parts, often referred to 
as asymmetric federalism had some unexpected results. Of the 21 ethnic republics, the 
level of autonomy allowed by specific agreements on autonomy, also referred to as 
                                                      
1
 Bukharaev, Ravil. The Model of Tatarstan: Under President Mintimer Shaimiev. (Richmond: Curzon, 
1999), 64. 
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bilateral treaties, varied greatly. Tatarstan, the first republic to sign such an agreement, 
had been granted much more independence from Moscow than republics with similar 
religious, geographic and economic characteristics. As the first republic to reach an 
agreement with the Kremlin, this Muslim republic on the Volga became a paradigm for 
the other ethnic regions. The case of Tatarstan stands out as an exception because it 
achieved the most concessions without threats of violence or secession, which were the 
norm in other ethnic regions. Despite the copious amounts of research into the Tatarstan 
case, the question remains: how was Tatarstan able to negotiate an unprecedented level of 
autonomy without threats of violence or secession, while instability and violence was the 
expected norm in the ethnic regions of the Russian Federation. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN FEDERALISM 
 During the Communist period, policies on nationality developed and unified 
ethnic groups through identity creation and language standardization. The most populous 
ethnic groups were given titular homelands under the Soviet system. When the USSR 
began to dissolve in the early 1990's, ethnically-based territories with well-defined 
borders and governing institutions already existed, making it much easier for the "parade 
of nationalities" to begin. 
 As the Soviet Union unraveled, the territories known as Union Republics became 
their own separate countries. These larger areas, such as Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, were 
on Russia's border and had most of the trappings of statehood under the Soviet system, 
easing their transition to independence. However, within Russia's territory, ethnically 
distinct regions smaller than the union republics, which did not become independent 
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states as the USSR fell apart. The Russian leadership, seeing the trend towards ethnic 
self-determination and statehood, worried that these ethnic regions would break away, 
leaving Russia looking like a piece of Swiss cheese.  
 As a solution to their "ethnicity problem," the Russian leadership began to 
negotiate treaties that would grant semi-autonomy to the twenty-one ethnic regions. The 
resulting system of complex federalism is characterized by ethnic minorities controlling 
have their own titular regions within Russia, enjoying varied levels of independence. In 
1990s Russia, negotiations toward complex federalism created a diverse set of outcomes, 
of which Tatarstan arguably achieved the most autonomy of all the ethnic republics.  
 Tatarstan is a region located at the intersection of the Volga and Kama rivers, in 
the southwest region of Russia. Its capital, Kazan, was home to the Tatar-Mongol hordes 
who arrived in the 13th century, established the Kazan Khanate and subjugated the 
Russian population, often called the "Tatar-Mongol Yoke." In 1552, Tsar Ivan IV (Ivan 
the Terrible), defeated the Kazan Khanate and absorbed the Tatar lands into Muscovy, 
where they have remained ever since.2 Since its founding 1991, Mintimer Shaimiev has 
held the position of President of Tatarstan. 
 Tatarstan is a region vital to the economic activities of Russia, located on the 
Volga, a major shipping route, and the Trans-Siberian railroad. Located in the Republic 
are significant oil resources, along with defense, energy and manufacturing facilities 
which are vital to Russia as a whole.3 According to the 1989 census, the population of the 
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 Roza N. Musina, "Contemporary Ethnosocial and Ethnopolitical Processes in Tatarstan" In Ethnic 
Conflict in the Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis, ed. L. M. Drobizheva (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. 
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republic is 49% Tatar and 43% Russian.4 Tatarstan is the titular homeland of the Tatar 
ethnic group, although there is a very large diaspora, with three-quarters of Tatars living 
outside Tatarstan.5 Although the official languages are Tatar and Russian, bilingualism is 
common among the Tatar population: 77.2% are fluent in Russian, while only 1.1% of 
the Russian population is fluent in Tatar.6 Sunni Islam is the dominant faith, with 55% of 
the population reporting to be Muslim, and a 100% increase in the number of Muslims in 
the last 25 years.7  
 After the fall of the Soviet Union, nationalists and government elites within 
Tatarstan demanded an independent, Tatar homeland. Based on the histories of minority 
populations who demanded independence from their more powerful state, this conflict 
was likely to result in violence. One need not look further than the violence in Russia's 
other ethnic republics in the Caucasus and Tuva in Siberia observe the possible 
consequences of independence demands. Surprisingly, Tatarstan was able to negotiate a 
treaty with the Russian government without much escalation in the conflict, and was the 
first in a steady stream of other regions and republics who joined in the "parade of 
nationalities."  
 Tatarstan is an exemplary and unique case among the semi-autonomous regions 
of the Russian Federation, the only one which was able to receive certain concessions 
from Moscow and was able to maintain a non-adversarial relationship with the Federal 
leaders. Tatarstan's experience and results paved the way for subsequent agreements 
negotiated between ethnic republics and the Kremlin. Tatarstan is perceived as a leader 
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5
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6
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7
 Alexey D. Krindatch, "Patterns of Religious Change in Postsoviet Russia: Major Trends from 1998 to 
2003," Religion, State & Society 32, no. 2 (June 2004), 123. 
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among Russia's ethnic republics, especially in the areas of inter-ethnic relations, center-
regional relations, and economic development.  The experience of Tatarstan is often 
studied as an exemplary center-periphery interaction, and is referred to as "The Tatarstan 
Model," the path taken by Tatarstan down its road to autonomy, to include negotiations, 
referenda, and other relations with Moscow. These scholars, journalists and politicians 
cite various explanations of Tatarstan's exceptionalism, but most tend to disregard critical 
facts and miss the mark on explaining how Tatarstan achieved its unique status.  
 
EXPLAINING THE "TATARSTAN MODEL" 
 In explaining Tatarstan's unique autonomy vis-a-vis other regions of the Russian 
Federation, history, culture, geography, demographics, economics and religion are all 
commonly cited components. Roza Musina, who places the emphasis on history and 
culture, exaggerates the amity of interethnic relations in Tatarstan, arguing that there has 
been no crisis in Tatar-Russian relations and making the further claim that a "high level 
of mutual tolerance and trust remains characteristic of interethnic relations in Tatarstan." 
She ignores the "Tatarization" effort made by the Shaimiev regime, a program to 
systematically undermine the cultures of non-Tatar residents of the republic, but 
acknowledges the educational, economic and ethnic disparities between rural and urban 
populations. Musina asserts that ethnic tolerance and trust that she perceives in Tatarstan 
resulted from generations of Russian-Tatar co-habitation and the Tatar predisposition to 
peacefulness.8 She says that there is a special Russian-Tatar relationship and mutual trust 
built on centuries of cooperation. It may be true that Russian and Tatars have a closer 
relationship than other ethnic populations in the Russian Federation. As Alexei 
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Malashenko notes, Russians and Tatars have become used to living near one another, the 
"Russian man in the street apparently ignores the Tatar’s Muslim identity: they are just 
neighbours that everyone has come used to."9 The characterization of Tatar-Russian 
relations as persistently peaceful is an assumption that cannot be made based on the 
virility of the Tatar nationalist movement. Musina concludes, based on her low estimation 
of the potential for Tatar nationalism and inter-ethnic strife, that these factors lowered the 
conflict potential and caused a peaceful resolution. The logic of this statement does not 
follow, because if the Tatars had no potential to have a violent opposition to Russia's 
actions, then Russia would not have to make any concessions. The fact that Tatarstan 
won more concessions than any other republic indicates that the republic had something 
to bargain with. Still, Musina implies that the Russian government had no reason to fear 
violence in Tatarstan because of the "nature of Tatars," which is a very disappointing 
argument from a scholar on ethnic conflict.  
 If one considers the possibility of ethnic favoritism playing a role in autonomy 
negotiations between Russia and Tatarstan, one would not expect to see a Tatar 
nationalist movement that was active and had political influence in the republic. If the 
relationship between Tatars and Russians was amicable to the extent that Musina 
describes, then one would also not expect to see the marginalization of Russians in 
Tatarstan in education, culture and politics. There was ethnic tension between rural, poor 
Tatars and wealthy Russian urbanites, and the government operated an active campaign 
of "Tatarization." In fact, leading up to the March 21, 1992 referendum, when Tatars 
voted on the status of Tatarstan within Russia, Valery Zorkin, Chairman of the Russian 
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 Alexei Malashenko, "Islam, the Way we See it," Russia in Global Affairs 4, no. 4 (October - December 
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Constitutional Court, anticipated "seas of blood."  In the media during this period, 
Russian reports in the Republic used phrases such as "national separatism," "Islamic 
fundamentalism," "a little island of communism," and "a theocratic Bantustan." Not to be 
outdone, the Tatar media called Russia a "chauvinistic empire."10  The case of Tatarstan 
is unique because this clearly contentious situation did not escalate to violence and 
resulted in an amicable Kazan-Moscow relationship.  
 Some scholars cite the lack of credibility in the Tatar demand for autonomy as the 
reason for Tatarstan's ability to negotiate an unprecedented level of autonomy without 
violence. In The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests and the Indivisibility of 
Territory, Monica Duffy Toft argues that an ethnic group must have "legitimacy" in order 
to achieve independence. She asserts that geographic factors of the Tatar population left 
the Tatar nationalist movement in a weak position, which they eventually moderated. The 
key factors for Toft are Tatarstan's lack of external borders and large diaspora. Toft 
argues that being contained entirely within Russian territory would mean an independent 
Tatarstan would have to rely on Russia for economic and human flows across its borders. 
Further, it would be in a very vulnerable position tactically, already surrounded on all 
sides by a potential aggressor nation. Further, Toft claims the Tatar diaspora does not 
give Tatarstan credibility as the homeland of the Tatar people. Together she believes that 
these factors would give disincentives for international support and it would be extremely 
difficult for Tatarstan to achieve independence.  
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 The power-sharing agreement that was signed by Russia and Tatarstan in 1994 
came about, according to Toft,  because both Tatar and Russian demands were 
moderated. Tatar leaders settled for more control over their economy rather than identity 
or land, while Russian interests centered on precedent-setting for the other separatist and 
ethnic regions. Ultimately, Tatarstan's weak geographic position allowed for negotiation 
and an agreement. Toft argues that Tatarstan appears to have gained more sovereignty 
than expected, but Russia's position remained unwavering and they manipulated the Tatar 
independence movement by making a few concessions.11  
 While Toft's arguments do address some key reasons why Tatarstan would not be 
a legitimate state, it does not follow that a low threat of Tatar secession would cause 
Moscow to give Tatarstan more autonomy than any other republic. One would expect to 
see those republics with the most legitimacy (external borders, economic viability, and 
concentrated ethnic population) achieve the highest levels of autonomy. Since Russia 
negotiated with Tatarstan regardless of their legitimacy problems, (significant diasopra, 
territory entirely within Russia) we can assume that Moscow took Tatarstan's autonomy 
demand seriously.  
 A possible explanation to Russia's perception that Tatarstan had legitimacy as an 
independent state, contrary to Toft's assessment, it was not out of the realm of possibility 
for Tatarstan to have an external border. Within the republic of Tatarstan, Tatars make up 
49% of the population. In the adjacent republic, Bashkortostan, Tatars make up 28%, 
even more than Bashkirs, who are 22% of the population. Together, the population of 
Muslim ethnic groups in Bashkortostan is approximately 56%.  The cultural and 
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 Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of 
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linguistic characteristics of Tatars and Bashkirs is considered very close, such that some 
members of these groups identify themselves interchangeable in government censuses.12 
Located south of Tatarstan are two Russian oblasts, Orenburg and Samara, where the 
Muslim population was 15.2% in 1989 and 16.8% in 2002.13 The southeast section of the 
oblast is populated by Tatars, Bashkirs and Kazakhs, while the northwest areas are 
populated by Tatars.14 Sharing the southern border of this oblast is Kazakhstan, whose 
titular ethnic group has the same linguistic roots and religious denomination as Bashkirs 
and Tatars. The extension of the Tatar and Bashkir populations south and the Kazakh 
population north creates what is called the "Orenburg Isthmus."15 In Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan, the Tatar and Bashkir groups together have a small majority, and 
therefore it is reasonable to consider the possibility of these ethnic lands being extended 
along the concentrated areas of Orenburg Oblast, which have more than 20% Tatar and 
Bashkir populations. A hypothetical "Tatar-Bashkiria" would then have an external 
border and would fulfill the aspirations of some nationalist groups who have been 
working toward this kind of pan-Islamic republic for decades. Although there is no 
current information to suggest that this scenario is likely; it does show that the Russian 
government was unlikely to discount the legitimacy of Tatarstan's autonomy demand 
when it was extremely sensitive to losing territory in a manner like the hypothetical 
"Tatar-Bashkiria."  
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 Dmitry P. Gorenburg, Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
13
 Timothy Heleniak, "Regional Distribution of the Muslim Population of Russia," Eurasian Geography 
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 Moukhariamov, The Tatarstan Model: A Situational Dynamic, 224. 
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 Since there were ethno-nationalist movements and tensions in Tatarstan, and the 
Kremlin considered the Tatar demand for autonomy seriously, then it seems that the two 
were on a collision course for violence. The way in which this violence was prevented 
and an agreement was reached is often referred to as the "Tatarstan Model." This term 
was coined during Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev's visit to Harvard University in 
1994.16 Alexei Zverev, in "Qualified Sovereignty: The Tatarstan Model for Resolving 
Conflicting Loyalties," defines the Tatarstan Model as the combination of six 
characteristics of Tatarstan: geographic position, bi-ethnic composition, diaspora, historic 
relationship with Russians, oil, and Tatar national movement with the tempering presence 
of an experienced leader. Zverev argues that there are two main aspects of the Tatarstan 
Model: peaceful resolution to conflicts between republic and center and the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts within the republic itself. He argues that the Tatars decided the 
limitations of the sovereignty they could legitimately demand, resulting in "qualified 
sovereignty."17 
 While Zverev carefully considers the many aspects of the Tatarstan case, his 
argument is too simplified, because he does not attempt to explain how these factors 
affected autonomy. By combining all the political dynamics of the republic and the 
republic's relationship to Moscow into one category, Zverev grossly underestimates how 
many factors within each dynamic could have changed the outcome.  
 Nail Midkhatovich Moukhariamov, in "The Tatarstan Model: Situational 
Dynamic," has a more satisfying explanation of the "Tatarstan Model," describing it as 
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three simultaneous processes. He argues that Tatar leadership successfully maneuvered 
the Russian legal waters to prevent legal blockage of the republic's sovereignty. At the 
same time, rhetoric from Tatar nationalists and Russian leaders intensified, but 
ultimately, elite pragmatism based on the understanding that economic cooperation 
would increase stability, resulted in compromise. Moukhariamov's argument explains 
how political dynamic facilitated compromise, but does not explain why these dynamics 
occurred. For example, he argues that Russian flexibility and elite pragmatism, was a key 
factor, but he does not address why Russians were flexible and pragmatic.18  
  
AUTONOMY THROUGH TRUST AND AUTHORITARIANISM 
This thesis aims to elaborate on the existing explanations of the Tatar-Russian 
autonomy compromise and outline two dynamics that complemented each other and 
together resulted in Tatarstan achieving the highest level of autonomy in the Russian 
Federation.  The dynamic of trust between Russian and Tatar elites complemented the 
Tatar government's authoritarian control of the republic.  
 Trust does not yet have an accepted definition within the context of political 
interactions. According to Levi and Stoker in the Annual Review of Political Science,19 
most definitions have some characteristics in common. Their survey of the literature on 
political trust indicates that scholars view trust as relational, pertaining to "an individual 
making herself vulnerable to another individual, group, or institution that has the capacity 
to do her harm or to betray her" and conditional, "given to specific individuals or 
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 Margaret Levi and Laura Stoker, "Political Trust and Trustworthiness," Annual Review of Political 
Science, vol. 3 (2000), 475-507. 
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institutions over specific domains."20 The amount that an actor will make themselves 
vulnerable and the areas to which this vulnerability will apply, increase or decrease 
depending on the amount of trust. The criteria upon which trustworthiness is evaluated 
can be described as the credibility, competence and threat potential of another political 
actor. While most of the literature on political trust pertains to the citizenry's trust in 
government, Larson and Listhaug have developed definitions of trust between states 
and/or political elites. Larson's work highlights two levels of political trust, between state 
and elites. Among states, she defines trust as the ability to "rely on a state to observe 
treaties and to fulfill its commitments and promises."21 She observes that "because the 
amount of trust required for an agreement varies, states can overcome the barrier of 
mutual suspicion by starting with small agreements where less is at stake so that each 
state can test the other's intentions without putting too much at risk. In this way, states 
can acquire information about the other's values and reliability before they move on to 
riskier agreements."22 Closely related but distinct is Larson's treatment of trust between 
elites. She places the meaning of trust in three key concepts: predictability, credibility 
and benevolent intentions.23 She notes that the psychological definition of trust is 
"reliance on one another at the risk of a bad outcome should the other cheat or renege,"24 
Thus, the decision to trust is made if "the probability of a good outcome outweighs the 
risks that her trust will have adverse consequences."25 Listhaug's definition of trust 
emphasizes the behavior of the political actor in "accordance with normative 
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expectations".26 Such expectations in relations between political elites will vary based on 
past experiences, and can be generalized as Larson's three concepts: predictability, 
credibility and benevolent intentions. 
 This study deals with trust between with elites who are acting on behalf of states 
when negotiating treaties. Therefore, the definition of trust will combine elements of the 
state-state and individual- individual definitions. In this thesis, trust will refer to the real 
or perceived ability to rely on an actor's adherence to agreements, non-adversarial 
behavior, predictability and competency. The definition in the case of Russia's bilateral 
treaties must encompass the state-to-state and interpersonal levels because many of the 
elites integral in this process had shared experiences which colored their evaluation of the 
trustworthiness of other elites. The legacy of membership in the communist party is 
inextricable from the dynamics of the republics' autonomy negotiations. 
 Scholars have not yet determined a commonly accepted standard by which to 
measure trust, but some have conducted their research around characteristics such as 
competence, integrity, fairness, regime type, political actors.27 The cases in this thesis 
will be measured against the definition of trust previously mentioned, based on the real or 
perceived ability to rely on an actor's adherence to agreements, non-adversarial behavior, 
predictability and competency. The evidence will be used to demonstrate indicators of 
these components. For example, the adherence to agreements would be indicated by 
following through on prior commitments, whether they are treaties, agreements or 
keeping one's word at an interpersonal level. The indicators that could be used to evaluate 
an actor's non-adversarial behavior might include having interests similar to one's own, a 
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 Cited in Margaret Levi and Laura Stoker, "Political Trust and Trustworthiness," Annual Review of 
Political Science, vol. 3 (2000), 498. 
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 Ibid., 496-497. 
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history of cooperative behavior and benevolence. For states cooperation and benevolence 
could be observed in the types of demands made in state-state negotiations, policies 
regarding borders, and sharing information, such as intelligence. On a personal level, 
political actors could estimate another's benevolence or willingness to cooperate based on 
rhetoric, demeanor, and actions. Predictability and competence are perhaps easier to 
judge than the previous criterion, and may be assessed, on a state or individual level as 
how the entity's actions are similar to the prior actions, and whether the entity acts in its 
own interest. Not acting according to one's own interests can be seen as being 
unpredictable and not competent, since it only hurts oneself.  
 The characteristics of trust outlined here do not all need to be present in order for 
trust to exist I order for there to be a trusting relationship between political actors. Each 
characteristic is a way to gauge the trustworthiness of another entity, and are important to 
different degrees depending on the strength of the other characteristics and the particular 
situation. For example, an autocrat who is willing to cooperate, has taken no adversarial 
actions and adheres to agreements may not be able to be trusted if they are wildly 
unpredictable ad incompetent in their state; the inability to predict their future actions 
may undermine the trust of other states, since benevolence may change at a moment's 
notice. Likewise, a state which acts predictably and in its own interests, even when it is 
known to adhere to agreements, may be deemed untrustworthy if the state takes overtly 
hostile actions. The decision of whether or not to trust is an evaluation done over time 
and can be altered by emotions, history, culture and personal relationships. Nevertheless, 
it is of central importance to negotiations, and the Tatarstan-Russia autonomy 
negotiations were no exception.  
 15 
 
Practical indicators that will used to inform the analysis of trust in this study 
include: the character and quality of personal relationships between political elites, 
willingness to cooperate, common goals among elites and governments and credibility 
among peers.  
Elite trust enabled Tatar leaders to use personal networks to gain favor with 
federal leaders and to be perceived as a reasonable group that could act as a mediator and 
example to other republics. As a result, the Russian leadership viewed the Tatar elite as a 
group with whom negotiation was possible. The non-escalation of the conflict kept it 
within the Federal legal system, which was advantageous to Tatarstan, where most of the 
republic's elites were members of the Soviet regime with ties to Moscow, and had 
knowledge of the legal system. Their experience made the playing field more level, and 
Tatarstan was able to legally block key anti-autonomy efforts by the Kremlin.  
Authoritarianism, although it is widely studied and has many unfortunate cases, 
has numerous definitions presented in the scholarly discourse. While these definitions 
disagree on the details, they generally accept authoritarianism as a system where the 
power is held by the leader rather than the population. Theodore Vestal defines 
authoritarianism as a "repressive system that excludes political challengers", with "highly 
concentrated and centralized power structures" which use political and social institutions 
and groups to "mobilize people around the goals of the government."28 Authoritarianism 
has many different degrees to which it is practiced, including "semi-authoritarianism", 
which are particularly pertinent to the governments of the former Soviet states and 
satellites. Marina Ottaway defines semi-authoritarian regimes as "ambiguous systems that 
                                                      
28
 Theodore M. Vestal, Ethiopia: A Post-Cold War African State. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 17. 
 16 
 
combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some formal 
democratic institutions and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with 
essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits….regimes determined to maintain the 
appearance of democracy without exposing themselves to the political risk that free 
competition entails."29 Thomas Carothers agrees that the motivation of these leaders, 
whom he calls "soft strongmen," is to balance their stability in a position of power and 
their control over the populace. He explains: "Semi-authoritarian regimes follow some 
forms of democracy yet maintain sufficient limits on political openness to ensure they are 
in no real danger of losing their grip on power."30  
 In this thesis, authoritarianism will be defined as a political system that is 
centralized at all levels of government, gives political advantage to the regime's interests, 
and has a weak or non-existent opposition. Authoritarian regimes have numerous 
indicators, not all of which must be present to be considered authoritarian, since in real 
cases these characteristics are observed to different degrees in every government. Vestal 
identifies five characteristics of authoritarian regimes, to include: "rule of men, not rule 
of law", "rigged elections", "all important political decisions made by unelected officials 
behind closed doors", "a bureaucracy operated quite independently of rules, the 
supervision of elected officials, or concerns of the constituencies they purportedly serve", 
and "the informal and unregulated exercise of political power".31 Practical indicators that 
will used to inform the analysis of authoritarianism in this study include: lack of 
transparency, corruption, weak civil society, lack of independent media, continuity of 
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political elite, weak or non-existent opposition to the ruling regime, and government 
involvement in the economy.   
Through regional authoritarianism, the Shaimiev government maintained stability 
by controlling electoral procedures, government institutions, media and opposition 
groups, which proved to be of great benefit to the federal center in transition. This 
stability gave the federal authorities incentive to assist the Shaimiev administration in 
power, which limited the chaos in the Federation. The Tatarstan government manipulated 
nationalist groups to be more active to put pressure on the Russians, reiterating the need 
for Tatar-Russian cooperation.  
 In the negotiations between Tatarstan and Russia, trust and authoritarianism 
complemented one another to result in a treaty allowing Tatarstan a high level of 
autonomy. In this situation, trust and authoritarianism developed prior to the 
commencement of negotiations, so it cannot be said that one affected the onset of the 
other during the negotiations.  What can be said is that authoritarianism was a necessary 
foundation on which to set the preexisting trust between elites. Trust, just as Larson 
explains, is given within a specific confine, which means that the state which trusts a 
region will only devolve this trust within the confines of that state's territory. If this 
region is authoritarian, then there is more predictability and ability to take only the 
actions in the regimes' interests, both indicators of trustworthiness. In the relationship 
between Tatarstan and Russia, the shared experiences and personal relationships of the 
political elite enabled judgment as to penchant for adversarial behavior or potential to 
renege on agreements. The regional authoritarianism further supported the perception of 
the regional government as trustworthy, because they were predictable, reliable, and 
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acted in their own interests, which included preserving stability. Authoritarian control 
was also a bargaining chip for the republican regime, which could raise and lower the 
separatist volume in order to pressurize negotiations. In this case it is clear that both 
authoritarianism and trust were necessary to maximize Tatarstan's autonomy within the 
Russian Federation.   
 This thesis will show how these dynamics played out during the Yeltsin and Putin 
administrations and will demonstrate how these dynamics, elite trust and authoritarianism 
must both be present in order for the republic to achieve the level of autonomy that 
Tatarstan enjoys today. 
 Elite trust and regional authoritarianism acted upon each other to keep the balance 
of incentives for both Tatarstan and Russia. As an authoritarian regime, the Tatar 
government wanted to remain in power and manipulated opposition groups to 
demonstrate its ability to keep order in the region. The Russian government, wanting 
calm in its ethnic regions, valued the stability of the Shaimiev regime, which it perceived 
as more reasonable other republics due to shared values and political pasts.  
 Chapter 2 will explain the dynamic of elite trust and Chapter 3 will explain the 
authoritarianism of Shaimiev's regime. Chapter 4 will present a comparison of Russia’s 
autonomous republics and will analyze how elite trust and regional authoritarianism 
affected their level of autonomy.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
ELITE TRUST 
 
 Trust is an essential component of the dynamics of the relationship between the 
leadership in Tatarstan and Russia. This chapter will show that Shaimiev and the Kremlin 
have for decades taken actions for political gain that were not completely in the interests 
of their own populations, and that the relationship between individual leaders was the 
cause of the amicable negotiations and agreements. 
 In this analysis, trust defined as the relationship between individuals or groups of 
individuals whose relationship is characterized by a positive relationship, long-term 
interaction, coinciding interests and the participants' rational actions. A key indicator of 
trust is a positive relationship, where prejudices, grudges or resentment do not interfere 
with the interaction of the parties. It is important for trust that the participants in a 
relationship do not harbor ill will for the other side personally or as a group, such as 
ethnic or national prejudices which increase the incentives to do harm to the other party. 
A negative relationship also is based on or is perceived to be based on a past breach of 
trust by one or both sides. Trust is also indicated by the length of interaction. A longer 
interaction allows both sides to learn how the other side will react and to gauge their 
reliability. When the interests of the parties to the relationship coincide, there tends to be 
stronger trust, since each knows that what harms their interest will also harm the interest 
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of the other. This is, however, difficult to analyze, especially between elites who are 
engaging in a personal relationship. At this level, for example, the leaders' incentives 
could be to maintain power through authoritarianism, although they publicly support 
democratization. In this case, the leaders' incentives might lead to actions reinforcing one 
another in their authoritarian control and maintaining the status quo. An indicator of trust 
that is perhaps the most important and essential characteristic is the rational action of the 
participants. Trust is based on knowing what the other will do and an irrational individual 
or group will behave in an unpredictable manner, not necessarily based on their own 
interests, or past actions and agreements.  
 In the relations between Russia and Tatarstan, as they negotiated for a resolution 
to Tatarstan's autonomy demands, relations were tense, but they had the potential to 
become even more contentious without a successful negotiation. Russian leaders were 
concerned about a "parade of nationalities" breaking away from the Federation, and 
although the Tatarstan government did not threaten secession, its numerous nationalist 
groups did. Tatarstan was not equipped to function independently of Russia. Both sides 
had much to lose if the situation ended in violence. Russia feared losing further territory 
and feared that if Tatarstan became violent, other regions would be incited to secede. 
Tatarstan's leadership was adverse to violence, as it was no match for the Russian army. 
Both were interested in a negotiated, non-violent solution to the autonomy demands, and 
because many Tatar and Russian leaders were members of the former Soviet regime, they 
had an existing connection which facilitated the trust that is essential in a successful 
negotiation.  
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 This chapter will show how the trust established through shared experiences in the 
former regime benefitted Tatarstan. Russian leaders tended to give the republic deference 
regarding its stubbornness and boldness to challenge Moscow in the autonomy 
negotiations. This trust was utilized by Tatarstan's leadership to create the perception of 
being political insiders, which allowed them to negotiate on a legal level, even when their 
actions were in violation of Russian Federation laws. Since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, trust between the Tatar and Russian elites has facilitated non-violent and 
relatively amicable relations.  
 
SHARED PASTS 
 The basis of the trust between the Russian and Tatar leadership were the personal 
connections they developed while members of the Soviet government. This personal 
network was created by the Soviet use of appointments, Party congresses and sub-
organizations which brought people together and allowed them to make connections. 
Elites in federal and regional government were linked through shared values and social 
norms, links which proved to be integral in the negotiation process.  
 The Communist system was structured to bring politicians and bureaucrats to the 
center, Moscow. Typically, a politician could work his way to higher ministerial posts, 
take a position in the Party and become an influential political member of the 
government. Party Congresses brought together all of these types of officials, as did 
regional congresses and congresses, which oversaw certain aspects of society, like 
religious organizations.32 
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 The large number of appointed positions encouraged the development of a 
network of insiders. Overall, the Soviet system engendered in its members the feeling of 
being part of the club. Even when this club officially dissolved, the members 
undoubtedly still knew who they were and maintained a feeling of fraternity. When the 
Soviet Union fell, these bureaucrats and politicians became the members of the new 
Russian government. 
 
ELITE CONTINUITY 
 Continuity of leadership from the Soviet regime to the Russian Federation 
allowed the social networks created under the Communist system to persist and become 
new networks on a regional and national scale. In Tatarstan, the continuity of leadership 
from the Soviet to the Post-Soviet period was nearly complete. Shaimiev facilitated this 
continuity by himself remaining in control of the republic, and facilitating the majority of 
the apparatchiks also staying in power.  
 Shaimiev was born in Tatarstan in 1937 and graduated from the Kazan 
Agricultural Institute. He became the Republic's Minister of Irrigation then was promoted 
to the Tatarstan Council of Ministers in the early 1980s, first as Deputy Chair, then as 
Chair. In 1989 he took the position of First Secretary of the Tatarstan Communist Party.33 
When Tatarstan declared sovereignty in 1990, Shaimiev became the first President, and 
retained most of the officials with whom he had served in the Soviet regime.  
 Shaimiev's first Prime Minister was Mukhammat Sabirov, who had previously 
held industrial management positions and party secretaryships and since 1983 had served 
as the Deputy Chair of Tatarstan's council of ministers. Farid Mukhametshin, Shaimiev's 
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former Prime Minister and the current speaker of the Tatarstan Parliament, began his 
career in the Komsomol, then serving as Minister of Trade, and eventually rising to the 
position of Speaker of the Supreme Soviet and a Deputy Chair of the Council of 
Ministers. Shaimiev's Vice President, Vasily Likhachev, a Russian, stood out among the 
overwhelming number of Tatars in high positions. Likhachev, former speaker of the 
Tatarstan Soviet, was specifically chosen because his ethnicity furthered the image of 
Tatarstan as a cooperative, multi-ethnic region, and because he was polite, tactful, and 
would not clash with Shaimiev. A lawyer by trade, Likhachev was given few 
responsibilities and was charged with promoting Tatarstan's image abroad.34 
 In addition to the continuity of the highest positions in the Tatarstan government, 
there was marked continuity in the entire republican administration. In 1992, of the 30 
ministers, chairs of state committees, and other appointed positions in the Tatarstan 
government, 26 were Tatar and 17 were former regime members. Additionally, only one 
person of the 30 came from a non-nomenklatura position, two were born outside of 
Tatarstan and one did not receive his higher education in Tatarstan.35 This trend had not 
changed by 1994, when a study found that 78% of the republic's executive posts were 
held by Tatars, and 68% were held by members of the previous regime. If the list of 
positions was increased to include positions previously appointed by the nomenklatura, 
then there was a 92% continuity of previous regime members.36  
 Shaimiev's regime was also heavily slanted toward the rural population, which in 
Tatarstan, tended to hold more nationalist views. In 1994, 75% of the government was 
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from rural areas and almost 50% was trained in agricultural or veterinary fields.37 The 
significance of the large percentage of republican elites from rural background is the 
“village culture” by which they lived and which affected their relationships and 
governing style. This culture is characterized by “traditional customs of servility; disdain 
for dissent and opposition; favoritism toward people from the same milieu, especially 
nepotism; distrust for strangers, particularly urbanites and the more educated stratum of 
society; self righteousness; and narcissism."38 For Shaimiev's regime, a group of 
politicians and bureaucrats holding these values would make his ability to control all 
aspects of political life an easy one.  
 
TRUST IN ACTION: YELTSIN AND SHAIMIEV 
 In republic-federal interactions, there was a similar continuation of social 
networks, and the respect and trust built over years of Soviet camaraderie resulted in the 
Tatar leadership often being given the benefit of the doubt, and enjoying a place of 
privilege in the minds of the Russian leadership. Russian leaders had strong incentives to 
support the continuity of former Soviet officials in the new republican governments. The 
Kremlin was deeply concerned about any additional loss of territory in the post-Soviet 
transition, and wanted to avoid even a small territory from achieving independence for 
fear of precedent setting and the further "unraveling" of their federation. 
 Having a relationship or shared past with regional leaderships benefitted the 
Russian leaders by maximizing the predictability and stability of their relations. The 
greater the bond between the center and periphery governments, the greater their ability 
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to bargain and prevent enmity. Both sides benefitted from a closer relationship, as they 
could more easily work together to maximize their economic benefits from the 
perspective of transportation and production cooperation and avoid the heavy costs of 
conflict.39 The relationship between Tatarstan and Russia during the Yeltsin and Putin 
regimes was substantively different, but in both periods Tatarstan enjoyed a "favored 
republic status" and was given the benefit of the doubt by the Kremlin. 
 The regions, sensing the impending disintegration of Russia in the spring of 1990, 
began to prepare for sovereignty, setting up the institutions needed to govern 
independently. Yeltsin needed regional support in order to oust Gorbachev, so in August 
1990, once he had been elected chairman of the Russian parliament, he instructed the 
republics to “take as much independence as you can swallow.” Yeltsin further tried to 
gain the republics' support by saying that he would allow them to control their natural 
resources, a loss for Russia and a deal-breaking condition for many of the republics.40 
Shaimiev successfully manipulated the 1991 election and made Yeltsin appreciate his 
importance to the President's success. Shaimiev orchestrated a low 36.6% turnout to 
Yeltsin's election in 1991, and only 16.4% of Tatarstan voters supported Yeltsin.41 
Yeltsin got the message that he needed Shaimiev's support and that in order to gain this 
support, the republic would need more concessions.42  
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 When Yeltsin was elected President on June 12, 1991, he began to make good on 
his promises, using presidential decrees to delegate power to the regional governments, 
although the Russian government was in general very opposed to granting independence 
to any regions.43 Tatarstan won concessions in the 1994 agreement, but Russia's 
leadership immediately made it clear that this was not meant to be a model for other 
region-federation agreements. Moscow's non-acceptance of precedent setting in this case 
shows that when dealing with Tatarstan, the Yeltsin government was motivated by the 
interdependency with republican elites and made special allowances, especially regarding 
republican self-government and economic matters.44 Under the 1994 treaty, President 
Yeltsin undertook not to interfere in the internal affairs of Tatarstan, while President 
Shaimiev gave a formal recognition for Moscow’s supremacy and support for Yeltsin 
during the all-Russia elections of 1996.45  
 The inconsistent treatment of Tatarstan compared to other republics came into 
stark relief when Russia commenced military operations in Chechnya in 1995. According 
to Hughes, the ethnicities of Yeltsin’s negotiating team in the early 1990s were meant to 
predispose them from coming to an agreement with Chechnya. The negotiation team 
consisted of Sergei Shakhrai, a Terek Cossack and Minister for Nationality and Regional 
Affairs, Ramazan Abdulatipov, a Dagestani Avar and Nikolai Yegorov, a Russian from 
Krasnodar. Some witnessing the negotiations reported that it seemed as if Shakhrai held a 
historically-based animosity for the Chechens who are stereotyped as prone to violence.46 
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In fact, one argument for invading Chechnya used by Russian interventionists in 1995 
was that Dudaev’s aggressiveness toward Chechen independence could incite other 
autonomy-seeking republics, including in the North Caucasus, Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan.47 The non-violence of the autonomy negotiation of Tatarstan in contrast to 
the violence of the Chechen wars shows a clear difference in attitude by the Russian-led 
negotiators. To the Russian administration, the Chechens, who were commonly perceived 
as irrational, deserved more animosity and suspicion than the more cooperative Tatars.  
 
Figure 1. With Boris Yeltsin, former President of the Russian Federation. Kazan. June 1996.48 
 
 Shaimiev and Yeltsin enjoyed a friendly and warm personal relationship. In 
general, Yeltsin made an effort to develop relationships with the "more obliging 
provincial barons."49 He remained in contact with officials he had known through the 
nomenklatura or in the USSR and RSFSR parliaments, and went on a "charm offensive" 
with others. The group of regional leaders with whom Yeltsin had a confidential 
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relationship included Nikolai Fedorov of Chuvashia, Nikolai Merkushkin of Mordovia, 
and Mintimer Shaimiev of Tatarstan.50 Shaimiev proved especially useful to Yeltsin, 
because he tried to mediate the Chechen conflict. Yeltsin informed Shaimiev in the early 
summer 1994 that he was thinking of meeting with Dudaev.51 Shaimiev played a 
mediator’s role in February 1996, submitting a peace plan to Dudaev and Yeltsin. It had 
seven points and called for talks on status, ceasefire, OSCE mediation, withdrawal of 
Russian forces, elections, reconstruction, and demilitarization.52 Although his attempts 
were unsuccessful, Shaimiev did what he could to aid the Russian President. The 
relationship was mutually beneficial. In May 1994, Yeltsin appeared in Kazan with 
Shaimiev and made comments on the signing of the power-sharing treaty with Tatarstan. 
"They beat me up and denigrated me for the treaty with Tatarstan, but nonetheless I have 
been proven right… Tatarstan has taken as many powers under the treaty as it can. The 
rest that remain with the federal government are enough to satisfy us."53 
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Figure 2. With the Acting President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin. Kazan Kremlin. March, 
2000.54 
  
TRUST IS TESTED: PUTIN AND SHAIMIEV 
 The relationship between Russia and Tatarstan was not as congenial under Putin 
as it had been under Yeltsin. Still, Putin's actions demonstrate that he has respect for 
Shaimiev. On his birthday in 2003, Tatar-Inform news agency reported that Shaimiev 
received numerous calls and messages from the leaders of the Russian Federation. Putin 
himself said "Sincerely I believe that your knowledge and experience will promote 
dynamical development of economy and successful resolving of social issues of the 
republic, strengthening stability, friendship and harmonization of interethnic relations for 
the blessing of all peoples of Russia."55 In Kazan, on Shaimiev's 70th birthday in 2007, 
Putin awarded Shaimiev the 1st degree Order "For Merits to the Fatherland," because of 
his "reputation, authority and political value," through which he had "greatly contributed 
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to constructing a truly federative state, at all times defending the principles of national 
integrity."56  
 Opposition leaders in Tatarstan claim that the relationship between Shaimiev and 
Putin is too cozy. Fauzia Bayrimova, the leader of nationalist group Ittifaq, told the 
Tatarstan press in 2000 that there was a secret arrangement between then newly-elected 
Russian President Putin and Shaimiev to keep Shaimiev in office. The agreement 
allegedly stipulated that Putin would not block Shaimiev's plan to seek a third term in 
office in violation of the Tatar and Russian constitutional term limits. In return, Shaimiev 
would agree to change the republic's laws to coincide with federal statute.57 It is difficult 
to know if these allegations are true, because Tatarstan's Constitution did eventually 
coincide with the federal level, and Shaimiev was elected to a third term. Also, Ittifaq is 
known for radical goals and outrageous, anti-regime statements. Nevertheless, the 
accusation is significant, because it highlights the fact that in a personally-connected, 
authoritarian system, there is little way to know what back-door deals are made between 
political elites. What is known about Shaimiev and Putin is that Shaimiev joined Putin's 
political party in 1999, and has since enjoyed an even higher level of prestige and 
political power. Bayrimova's accusation about Tatar laws being voluntarily changed to 
reflect the federal laws is hard to evaluate, because with the centralized, heavy-handed 
leadership of Putin, such a change was probably inevitable. We also know that the 
accusation about Shaimiev's agreement regarding term limits is at least partially true. We 
know that there was an agreement to "restart the clock" on term limits in 2004. Shaimiev 
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himself admitted that there were talks between him and the federal leader: "I said many 
times before that I would not go for another term, but since the situation with elections in 
Russia had changed, and the price of stability in Tatarstan is too high, the President asked 
me to stay on for another term. We discussed the details and I decided to do it."58 
 Regarding policy, however, Putin was not as lenient on Tatarstan. Under Putin's 
administration, recentralization was a goal of the federal government. Tatarstan was not 
immune, although it fared better than other republics. On May 17, 2000, Putin announced 
that the 89 subjects in the Russian Federation would be organized into seven federal 
administrative districts or okrugs, each with a presidential representative. These envoys 
would act as intermediaries, whom regional leaders would go through in order to 
communicate with Putin.59 The envoys acted as filters for communication and assumed 
other broad powers, such as overseeing the work of federal agencies in their district.60 
The institution of the envoys was an effort to formalize the relations between the center 
and the regions and was aimed at subordinating regional leaders by adding an additional 
layer of bureaucracy between them the Russian government.61  
 The first envoy for the Volga Federal District, which includes Tatarstan, was 
former Russian Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko, an unusually powerful politician to be 
appointed to this position.62 This appointment was probably made because Putin 
recognized that the Volga Federal District includes some of the strongest and most 
independent regions of the federation, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Samara and Nizhny 
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Novgorod. Only an accomplished, respected and strong envoy would have clout with the 
regional heads. In the end, these leaders did not use the chain of authority to deal with the 
federal center. Shaimiev, for example, always contacted Putin directly. The fact that 
Shaimiev was able to outright ignore the directive of the Kremlin shows the degree to 
which he had political latitude.63 
 In 2005, some rights of local government were cancelled, including the control 
over natural resources, a very sensitive issue in Tatarstan. The Federal government also 
increased the amount of taxes to be given to the federal government.64 Surprisingly, 
Tatarstan was affected very little by these federal changes. Shaimiev balanced the 
strategies of opposing Putin's measures which would reduce his power, while supporting 
those measures that would have no affect on him. This strategy also helped to keep to a 
minimum upset in Tatarstan over federal recentralization.   
 Under direction from Putin, the Prosecutor General's Office was tasked with 
evening the differences in the bilateral treaties with the republics, which in practice meant 
that many agreements with specific republics were broken. This restructuring also 
affected the republics' representation in the Federation Council, the upper house of 
Russia's Federal Assembly. Originally, a republic's seats were filled by regional 
governors and speakers of their legislatures, but under the new rules, republican leaders 
were obligated to select representatives to the Federal Assembly. The implied procedure 
was for these representatives to be selected in coordination with the Kremlin, thereby 
giving the President another way to control the politics of the semi-autonomous 
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republics.65 At the height of the Prosecutor General's efforts, Putin visited Shaimiev in 
Kazan, in an effort to assuage discontent in Tatarstan. Shaimiev made no statements 
indicating that he was not offended by the Kremlin's actions. However, in the following 
months Shaimiev changed his description of Tatarstan from a "sovereign" to a "self-
sufficient" republic, an obvious de-escalation of rhetoric.66 Shaimiev is a master at non-
committal fence-sitting, stating in the same period, “I also always defend the integrity of 
the Russian Federation. But this integrity does not mean that we should centralize all.”67 
Overall, Shaimiev's reaction to the consolidation of power was moderate. He supported 
maintaining the 1994 power-sharing agreement, because, as he argued, no other 
documents or decrees could govern the Russian-Tatar relationship.68  
 In September 2004, the Duma passed a bill that ended the direct election of 
regional leaders. The law dictated that all incoming governors be appointed and approved 
by local parliaments. The law also stipulated that if a local parliament did not approve the 
nominee three times in a row, the Russian President had the authority to dissolve the local 
parliament.69 Despite the devastating impact of the bill on regional governance, Shaimiev 
supported the bill, stating, "As for the change of the form of election of heads of the 
regions, it is first of all caused by the fact that in many regions today little known people, 
endorsed by money capital, come to power. It is certainly not a point in Tatarstan, but if 
we look at Russia as a whole, at regions and republics, this problem is acute."70 
Shaimiev's position demonstrates that his motives are not to maintain a semi-autonomous 
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Tatarstan, because this bill seriously sets back that goal. Shaimiev is most concerned with 
staying in power, which he achieves by altering his opinions, when necessary, to endear 
himself to Moscow. Shaimiev did not oppose the 2004 bill on the appointment of 
governors because, as a favorite of the Kremlin, he was not affected.  
 
SUSTAINING PERSONAL TRUST 
 Tatarstan's unique status is due not only to the political maneuvering of its 
President. Shaimiev had something tangible to offer Putin, which gave him many reasons 
to allow Shaimiev more breathing room than other republican leaders. Shaimiev is a very 
strong leader in the Volga region and among other republics, evident from the significant 
speeches on ethnic sovereignty that have been delivered in Kazan, including Yeltsin's 
"take all the sovereignty you can swallow" speech.  
 Shaimiev has demonstrated the ability to mobilize votes and influence the public 
opinion and political movements by virtue of his authoritarian control in the Volga 
region. The "village culture" helped him sway public opinion, along with his 
authoritarian control of the republic. For its influence in the Volga region and among 
ethnic republics, any Russian President must consider the electorate of Tatarstan vital to 
his success and therefore must win the favor of Shaimiev. Yeltsin relied on the ethnic 
regions to win his 1996 Presidential election, which he acknowledged by showing 
gratitude to the regional leaders afterward. Shaimiev did not originally support Putin 
when he came to power in December 1999, but the Tatar leader recognized that Putin was 
not going to be as soft on the autonomy demands of the republics as Yeltsin was and 
decided that it would be in his best interest to support the new Russian President. In 1999, 
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the Fatherland-All Russia bloc was formed by an agreement between Shaimiev and 
Moscow Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov, supported by Murtaza Rakhimov (President 
of Bashkortostan) and Ruslan Aushev (Ingush Lieutenant General). This party was 
instrumental in Putin’s victory in the 2000 elections.71 On January 11, 2000, only two 
months before Putin's Presidential election, Shaimiev appeared on NTV Television and 
announced that “Putin is the choice of the citizens of Tatarstan.”72 Shaimiev's January 
2000 appearance demonstrates how he played an instrumental role in the electoral politics 
of the Volga and earned Tatarstan the reputation of being the leader of the ethnic 
republics.  
  
THE BENEFITS OF EXPERIENCE 
 The Moscow News charged in 2007 that Shaimiev has managed to keep more 
sovereignty than is convenient for the Kremlin.73 The article claimed that the inequitable 
allowance of sovereignty was accomplished by Tatar politicians using their trust with 
Russian elites and their inside knowledge of the Russian legal system to stall and prevent 
Russian anti-sovereignty measures. Shaimiev chose which issues to pursue very 
carefully, with forethought as to what level of sovereignty would be reasonable for a 
landlocked, small territory like Tatarstan to receive. This strategy made him appear more 
moderate and reasonable and enabled the negotiation with the Russian authorities to 
continue with little contention. Shaimiev's reasonable nature was an aspect that he 
emphasized during the negotiation process, constantly reiterating the idea that Tatarstan 
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was not a rogue separatist region but a valuable member of the Russian Federation. In an 
interview with ITAR-TASS on February 25, 1992, Shaimiev stated, "I never talked of 
independence or even of separation. The question was not put that way…we have not 
raised any question about the borders, customs, military doctrine or our own currency. 
We, by all means, intend to strengthen our union with Russia and work out a treaty in the 
near future, which should stipulate the powers we can exercise together."74  
 Trust enabled Tatar leaders more access to the legal system, and by keeping it 
within the bounds of this system, they were able to stop some actions by the Russian 
government. If they had not tried to keep their negotiations within the Russian legal 
framework, in other words, if there was a breakdown in trust between the sides, then they 
would not have been able to exercise this advantage.75  
 On August 30, 1990, Shaimiev, as the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the 
Tatars Soviet Socialist Republic signed the "Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the 
Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic," which asserted "the inherent rights of Tatars, of the 
whole population of the Republic to self-determination," and with the goal of creating a 
"legal democratic state," proclaimed "Tatar state sovereignty." This sovereignty, 
according to the declaration, means that "the land, its natural resources and other 
resources on the territory of the Tatar SSR were the exclusive property of Tatar people," 
and was "basis for the creation of the Tatar SSR Constitution" which would "be supreme 
on the territory of the Tatar SSR," also referred to as The Republic of Tatarstan. This 
declaration also asserted the rights of Tatars to conduct international and inter-federal 
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relations according to their own design.76 Despite what this declaration asserted and what 
that meant for the interest of Russia, federal officials and Tatarstan's government quietly 
engaged in diplomacy regarding primarily economic issues.77 The August 1991 coup, or 
Putsch, widened governmental control and created more chaos in the federal government, 
which Tatar leaders took advantage of to take decisive political maneuvers in their 
negotiations with Moscow.78  
 In early 1992, talks over economic issues were held between Yegor Gaidar and 
Prime Minister of Tatarstan, Mukhammat Sabirov, and concluded with the "Agreement 
between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic 
of Tatarstan on Economic Cooperation." This document's primary impact was on oil 
exports, but opened the door to more talks.79 Signed on January 22, 1992, this was the 
first of 12 separate agreements signed by the Tatar and Russian governments that were 
negotiated until February 15, 1994.80  
 On March 21, 1992, Tatarstan officials decided to hold a referendum because 
their demands were not being met by the Russia government, including the abolition of 
federal taxes paid by republics. Meanwhile, the federal government was preparing a 
treaty to be signed by the ethnic regions.81 The referendum posed the question "Do you 
agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a subject of international law, 
which builds its relations with the Russian Federation and other republics and states on 
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the basis of equal agreements?" and won with 62% of Tatarstan voters in agreement.82 
Turnout was 82%, and, to the disappointment of the federal authorities, most of the 
Russian population voted in the affirmative.83  
 Two days after Shaimiev's successful referendum, he declared that Tatarstan 
would not sign the Federal Treaty. The treaty tried to formalize relations with the ethnic 
republics, and it stated that the republics were "sovereign," had the right to self-
determination and prohibited federal authorities from intruding into regional affairs. 
Although this treaty appeared to be close to the republics' demands, Tatarstan refused to 
sign it. Tatarstan wanted to achieve no less than Union republic status and the Federal 
Treaty granted the republics less status than the union treaty under Gorbachev. The 
Tatarstan leadership did want a relationship with Russia, it just wanted to not be a 
subordinate federal subject.84 The instincts of Tatar officials to not sign the treaty offered 
by Moscow were correct; as became clear later, this treaty was only based on intentions 
and did not set up any mechanisms for the document to be enforced.85 The bold move of 
not signing the federal treaty was enabled by the strong showing of support for 
Tatarstan's autonomy demonstrated by the referendum. This support was vital for 
Shaimiev, because having this popular support behind his defiance of the Kremlin 
decreased the Russian ability to retaliate.  
 Yeltsin appealed to the Russian Parliament to stop the Tatar referendum, fearing it 
would tear the Russian Federation apart. The Russian Constitutional Court ruled that the 
referendum and Declaration of State Sovereignty were in violation of the Russian 
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Constitution to which Tatarstan was subordinate.86 This ruling meant that the referendum 
had to be carried out again before Tatarstan could sign the Federal Treaty.87 With the 
exception of Chechnya and Tatarstan, all the ethnic republics signed the treaty. The 
Tatarstan referendum legally stalled the process of Tatarstan joining the Russian 
Federation, causing more of a headache for Yeltsin and giving Shaimiev more bargaining 
power the longer the republic remained in legal limbo.  
 Tatarstan adopted a constitution on November 6, 1992, that reaffirmed that 
Tatarstan "is a sovereign state, a subject of international law, associated with the Russian 
Federation and Russia on the basis of an Agreement on the reciprocal delegating of 
plenary powers and subjects of authority."88 The key to this document was that it declared 
the relationship between Moscow and Kazan to be an "association," and implied equal 
status, rather than the status of federal subject. The constitution also asserted that republic 
laws were supreme over federal laws, and citizens were dual citizens of Tatarstan and 
Russia.89 
 Shaimiev continued with the strategy of not acknowledging the legal challenges 
to his republic's founding documents. On April 25, 1993, and December 12, 1993, dates 
of federal referenda and elections, Tatars population boycotted the elections.90 The 
boycott sent the message that if Tatarstan did not have sovereignty, it would not 
participate in federal matters. The Russian constitution, adopted on December 1993, 
included a clause which Tatarstan used to legitimate its actions: "Outside of the 
jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the powers of the Russian Federation on issues 
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within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the Russian 
Federation, the subjects of the Russian Federation shall exercise the entire spectrum of 
state power."91  
 After the ratification of each of their constitutions, the Russia and Tatarstan set 
out to establish the first power-sharing treaty in the Russian Federation.92 The agreement 
was signed on February 15, 1994, and is called, "On the demarcation of Subjects of 
Jurisdiction and on Mutual Delegation of Plenary powers between Organs of Stats 
Authority of the Russian Federation and Organs of State Authority of the Republic of 
Tatarstan."93 This treaty is truly a compromise. Tatarstan agreed to be referred to as a 
"subject" of the federation, described as a state “united with the Russian Federation.” 
Phrasing in the document differed from the way it was described in Tatarstan’s 
Constitution, which used the phrase “associated with Russia." The Power-sharing treaty 
also did not list Tatarstan as a subject of international law, but Russia did concede to 
Tatarstan some powers referred to in the Russian constitution as joint federal-republican 
jurisdiction. This granted the republic the right to engage in foreign and international 
economic relations, write the republic’s budget and tax policies, and to establish alternate 
forms of civil service for Tatar citizens in the place of Russian military service.94 
 The power-sharing treaty did not resolve the many contradictions in the Russian 
and Tatar constitutions, but it brought the disagreement to a more stable point than it had 
been for four years. Shaimiev got a large amount of power in the agreement, namely 
fiscal control over taxes on the sale of alcohol, oil and gas as well as the right to transfer 
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the taxes paid on the military–industrial complex from the federal to the republican 
budget. Since many military facilities were located in Tatarstan and supported by the 
federal government, this revenue provided the republic with excess revenue. The tax 
advantages granted to Tatarstan in the power-sharing treaty are more obvious when 
compared to the other autonomous republics and regions. Tatarstan retained 
approximately 50% of the value-added tax revenue, while the other autonomous entities 
kept about 25%. The concession that enabled Tatarstan to enter into foreign economic 
agreements enabled the republic to become one of the wealthiest autonomous republics. 
Since then, Tatarstan has established economic ties with Turkey, Iran, Germany, France, 
the Netherlands, the UK, the USA, Australia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Poland and Lithuania.95  
 The high level of autonomy remained until April 2001, when Moscow attempted 
to bring the multiple republican constitutions into agreement with federal law. The 
Russian Supreme Court granted the federal government authority to take legal action 
against republics refusing to remove declarations of sovereignty from their constitutions, 
as well as the authority to remove uncooperative republican presidents and disband their 
legislatures. The Volga Federal District's envoy, Kirienko, announced that clauses 
regarding sovereignty would be stricken from the constitutions of Bashkortostan and 
Tatarstan.96 In April 2002, Tatarstan adopted a new constitution that acquiesced to 
Russian demands but maintained the republic’s right to conduct foreign relations, control 
its natural resources, and maintain a distinct Tatar citizenship. Most importantly, it 
incorporated the power-sharing treaty into the Tatarstan legal code, while maintaining 
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Tatarstan's unity with Russia on a voluntary, not obligatory basis.97 The April 2002 
Tatarstan Constitution was still objected to by Russian officials who claimed that it 
violated federal law at least fifty times.98  
 It took until March 2004 for Tatarstan to remove "sovereignty" from its 
constitution, and it was the last republic to do so, showing the skill and stubbornness of 
the Tatar government at putting up barriers to federal authority. It is clear how much 
leniency Tatarstan is given as far as not using force to implement the will of the 
Kremlin.99 Shaimiev's approach has been to present himself as a member of the 
establishment, and to frame the autonomy conflict as a legal struggle. Speaking to the 
Tatarstan State Council in 2003 he said, "The Constitution of the Russian Federation 
treats the republics as states, and it is well known that all states have sovereignty. No 
matter what federation it is - USA or Switzerland, a federation subject is considered 
sovereign within the frameworks of its powers. It might be the time for Russia as well to 
recognize that the federation is constructed on the basis of shared sovereignty i.e. on 
precise division of powers between the centre and the subjects."100 Shaimiev was able to 
manipulate the perception of himself and the perception of Tatarstan vis-à-vis 
sovereignty and skillfully remained on amicable terms with the Russian government 
throughout.  
 Trust is an essential component of the dynamics of the relationship between the 
leadership in Tatarstan and Russia. It enabled Tatar leaders to use personal networks to 
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gain favor with federal leaders and to be perceived as a reasonable group that could act as 
a mediator and example to other republics. The non-escalation of the autonomy 
negotiations kept it within the Federal legal system, which was advantageous to the 
republic’s elites, most of whom were members of the Soviet regime with ties to Moscow. 
Their experience made the playing field more level, and Tatarstan maximize its 
autonomy within the bilateral treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
REGIONAL AUTHORITARIANISM 
 
 In Russia's regions, little has changed in governance since the days of hammers 
and sickles under the Soviet Union. The democratization of Russia was not realized here, 
and in fact, most of the republics' leaders until the late 1990s were their last Communist 
leaders. Tatarstan is no exception, and Shaimiev has remained in power due to his ability 
to sustain authoritarianism in the republic. Nikolai Petrov, a leading scholar on Russia's 
regions evaluates democracy based on ten characteristics. In this assessment, 
authoritarianism is assumed to have characteristics that are lacking in democracy, or the 
opposite of those outlined by Petrov. Authoritarianism is thus characterized by a political 
structure that is off balance in favor of the regime, lack of transparency, no free and fair 
elections, a weak or non-existent opposition to the ruling regime, a lack of independent 
media, corruption, government involvement in the economy, weak civil society, 
continuity of political elite, and centralized control of all levels of government.101 
 Authoritarianism is a key component of the mechanisms that allowed Tatarstan 
and Russia to come to an agreement which granted Tatarstan an unprecedented level of 
autonomy. Control over the population of his republic and the ability to incite anti-
Kremlin sentiment were tools used by Shaimiev to make his leadership valuable to the 
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Russian government. Some believe that he held in his control the indirect ability to make 
federal-republican relations throughout Russia more difficult or more harmonious. He 
was careful to not become too authoritarian so as to incite anti-regime movements, and 
effectively limit opposition voices. Nevertheless, Shaimiev enjoys the reputation of being 
one of the most authoritarian republican leaders in the Russian Federation.102  
 Authoritarian statements made by Shaimiev in response to Putin's centralization 
efforts demonstrate how Shaimiev was not against a strong central government, and 
believed it was necessary for stability. Since the reforms of the Putin Presidency, 
especially the appointment of governors, regional heads are seen in a sympathetic light, 
as victims of an overreaching federal executive. This is not the case with Shaimiev; he 
has used his good rapport with the Russian leadership to exercise more autonomy than 
most republic presidents and has continued, if not exceeded, the amount of quasi-
authoritarian control held by the Russian President. Vladimir Gelman stresses that 
authoritarian leadership is common in Russian politics. He identifies a 5-pronged pattern 
of regional authoritarianism that consists of "the domination of executive authority over 
legislative authority," "strong personal loyalty between Moscow and the governor of the 
region," "indirect control over the mass media exerted by the executive branch,"  
"neutralization or suppression of potential opposition in the region," and "patronage of 
non-governmental organizations."103 Shaimiev is a regional authoritarian in this pattern, 
manipulating political actors, the electoral process, opposition groups, and mass media.  
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MANIPULATION OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
 According to the Constitution of Tatarstan, the republic is theoretically a 
democracy, but President Shaimiev has not allowed this to be realized. The official 
distribution of power in Tatarstan is a presidential-parliamentary of separation of powers, 
yet the de facto power rests with the President. Unchecked by the legislature, Shaimiev 
has his own broad legislative powers.104 The President of Tatarstan has broad control 
over the cabinet and ministers. He is able to directly appoint local chief executives and in 
the 1990s, “suggested” candidates for the Parliament, a crossover of his influence to the 
legislature. Eventually, the local chief executives became obligated to run for 
parliamentary seats. Shaimiev essentially appointed the members of Parliament, given the 
electoral advantage of regime incumbents. On paper, this practice ended with the 2002 
Tatarstan Constitution, but this change has not yet been implemented.105  
 Shaimiev kept the elites close to him in order to facilitate control over republican 
politics. Legitimate political challengers are prevented from gaining popularity and 
running in elections. Shaimiev's ability to fill the legislature with his allies is seen in the 
1999 election, when of the 123 deputies elected, 107 were on Shaimiev’s list of allies, 
mostly chief administrators and oil and gas company directors.106 Shaimiev has the 
reputation in Russia of being a "feudal lord" over the republic. There have been charges 
of corruption because of the amount of control that Shaimiev has over industries that are 
very lucrative and essential to Russia. Many of these businesses are under control of 
Shaimiev's relatives or close associates.107  
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 Media reports estimate that Shaimiev's family and close friends, due to their 
influential positions, influence as much as 70% of the republic’s economy.108 Shaimiev's 
sons Airat and Radik personally financially benefitted from their positions in the oil 
industry. Reportedly, it is common knowledge in Tatarstan that Prime Minister Rustam 
Minnikhanov, got his position through a shared passion for car racing with Shaimiev's 
son. The financial benefits of those in Shaimiev's "inner circle" are evident from the 
luxurious multi-storied dachas of regime leaders that surround Kazan and other cities.109  
 The regime recruits new members of the administration from the more heavily 
Tatar, clan-loyal, agrarian regions of Tatarstan.110 Many of the members of Shaimiev's 
government are from Aktanyshskii, the President’s native region.111 Shaimiev uses 
zemlyachestvo, or “gathering your own people around you,” to build an administration 
that is loyal, predictable and which he can manipulate. These "Zemlyak" networks 
facilitated cooperation vertically, through multiple levels of government, and 
horizontally, across the municipalities of the republic. These networks are a result of the 
Soviet “nativisation” policy that included the political ranks with locals, creating the 
current Tatar elite. Shaimiev takes advantage of this native Zemlyak network, but he is 
not shy to remove members of his administration if it is to his benefit. To this end, he has 
consolidated his power in the Presidency with a very loyal administration under him.112   
 Shaimiev keeps this administration loyal by tightly controlling the electoral 
process. Election laws in Tatarstan do not establish the same protections for free and fair 
elections as the federal laws do. For example, republican election laws do not require that 
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party representatives are included in local election committees to carry out and count the 
votes.113 The Tatarstan authorities have overtly manipulated election laws at least eight 
times since 1992.  “The Law on Presidential Elections in Tatarstan” has been altered five 
times, each time to aid Shaimiev. In 1996, the provision stating that the President could 
be no older than 65 was changed so that there is no age limit. Shaimiev was 59 at the 
time. Similarly, the term limits have been altered to benefit Shaimiev. In 1999 the 
Russian Constitutional Court ruled that term limits were not retroactive. This meant that 
Shaimiev’s third term, to which he was elected in 2001, was officially counted as the first 
of his two permitted five-year terms.114 In 2001, the electoral law was altered to coincide 
with the federal law "On the Fundamental Guarantees of Electoral Rights.” A major 
change was switching from a "negative" to "positive" voting technique. Negative voting 
meant the voter crossing out the names of candidates they wished to vote against, and 
was a persistent aspect of the Soviet system, used to psychologically manipulate voters 
and give the incumbents an advantage.115 Sadly, the legal changes did not amount to 
changes in practice, and elections continued to be conducted contrary to federal laws. 
 Shaimiev manages the various opposition groups within Tatarstan through a 
combination of restriction of freedoms, appeasement, and undermining. He works hard to 
control the image and message of the Republic through media and public relations. The 
result is his political security and longevity, as he effectively uses soft control tactics 
which do not rouse the population to oppose his authoritarianism. The population of 
Tatarstan has been accused of being politically indifferent because they placed a higher 
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value on stability than democracy and fell back into their old patterns of submission to 
the state.116  
 The Party of Edinstvo i Progress (“Unity and Progress”), led by R. Khakimov and 
A. Kolesnik, is the party of Shaimiev's regime and is the only party with political power. 
Other parties are allowed to exist; they have minor support and are used by Shaimiev to 
appear more pluralistic.117 In 1995, Shaimiev mobilized the entire government to prevent 
any non-regime candidates from winning a parliamentary seat. The resulting Parliament 
facilitated his consolidation of power to the Presidency. A key change during this 
Parliament's tenure was an end to parliamentary ratification of appointed positions.118 In 
1996 Shaimiev was up for re-election to a second five-year term. Although opposition 
candidates were encouraged, none successfully gathered the 50,000 signatures needed to 
be on the ballot. As a result, Shaimiev was unopposed and won re-election with 97.5% of 
the vote. The high turnout of 78% confirmed Shaimiev’s high level of support in 
Tatarstan.119 The 2001 Presidential election was the first time Shaimiev ran with 
opposition candidates on the ballot. These five candidates were Sergei Shashurin 
(Independent), Ivan Grachev (Equal Rights and Legality), Robert Sadykov (Communist 
Party, Republic of Tatarstan), and Alexandr Fedorov (Independent). In the election 
Shaimiev won with more than four times the percentage points than his four opponents 
combined. Some observers charged that this opposition was artificial and only meant to 
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make the election appear more democratic and honest. International observers reported 
biased media coverage that gave advantage to Shaimiev.120 
 
 
NATIONALIST DISSENT 
 The primary opposition to Shaimiev's regime has been from nationalists. These 
groups grew out of the Post-Communist transition, which unleashed anger over Russian 
imperialism and was fueled by political uncertainty and chaos. Tatar nationalist groups 
did not have majority support, and their members were primarily rural Tatars who had 
little contact with Russians.121  The rhetoric used was non-compromising, but did not 
incite violence. The demands were lofty, at times extreme, and meant to incite anti-
Russian sentiment. In 1993, Tatar nationalist newspaper Suverenitet, meaning 
"Sovereignty," and Nezavisimost, meaning "Independence" published the following 
statements: 122 
 “Tatarstan will be an independent state in spite of all the obstacles erected by the official   
 Moscow… Can we, Tatarstan, not lacking in national pride, honour and dignity, be citizens of  
 Russia, an empire that has arisen as a result of the colonial wars which had destroyed the Tatar  
 state along with the majority of its population?”123  
   
 “The introduction of two state languages in Tatarstan is a death verdict against the Tatar   
 language and the Tatar nation…To make us citizens of the Russian Federation means supporting  
 Russia’s imperial policy.” 124 
   
 “Tatarstan will never be a state within the framework of a wretched and famished Russian  
 Federation; the independent state of Tatarstan has broken away from the neighboring Russian  
 Federation like a spaceship reaching out to far-away worlds and planets” 125 
                                                      
120
 Roysi, Russian Centre and Periphery: Explaining the Political Autonomy of Tatarstan, 106. 
121
 Roza N. Musina, "Contemporary Ethnosocial and Ethnopolitical Processes in Tatarstan" In Ethnic 
Conflict in the Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis, ed. L. M. Drobizheva (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1996), 197. 
122
 Metta Spencer, Separatism: Democracy and Disintegration (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1998), 250. 
123
 Published in Nezavisimost, no.3 vol 5, 1993, page 3, as cited in Georgiy I. Mirsky, On Ruins of Empire: 
Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Former Soviet Union (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1997), 140. 
124
 Published in Suverenitet, no. 2, vol. 23, 1993, page 4, as cited in Ibid., 140. 
 51 
 
    
 “Tatarstan can live without its neighbor, Russia, but Russia can hardly survive without   
 Tatarstan…The  people of Tatarstan will build a flourishing state not subordinated to any foreign  
 power, Tatarstan will become a member of the UN.”126  
  
 Academics at Kazan State University can be credited with the founding of the 
current Tatar nationalist movement. In June 1988, the Kazan members of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences gathered during the Party Congress to discuss formalizing the 
growing nationalist sentiments into an organization.127 In January 1989, Tatars from 
across the Soviet Union held the first meeting of the All-Tatar Public Center (ATPC) in 
Kazan, marking the beginning of the modern Tatar nationalist movement. Their initial 
demands were the reduction of immigration of ethnic Russians into Tatarstan, and that 
Tatar to be designated Tatarstan’s official language. A more long-term goal of the ATPC 
was to raise the status of Tatarstan from an autonomous republic to a full union republic, 
which would enable it more control over the matters within its territory. The ATPC 
hoped that Tatarstan would eventually gain complete independence. In October 1989, 
ATPC membership in the USSR was approximately one million.128 In 1992, the Milli 
Mejlis, a nationalist parliament was founded to counter the official Tatarstan 
Parliament.129   
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Figure 3. Tatar Public Center (TPC) of Naberezhnye Chelny (1988-1989)130 
 
Figure 4. The May demonstration: R.Mukhametdinov, F.Bairamova, M.Mulukov (1991)131 
 
 The Tatar Independence Party, commonly known as Ittifaq, was a radical wing 
that broke off from the ATPC in 1990. According to their slogan, “Tatarstan for Tatars,” 
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they demand a republican government that promotes Tatar interests in every way and 
excludes Russians, to whom Ittifaq is overtly hostile.132 At the group's fourth party 
congress in December 1997, Ittifaq's leadership made this statement: 
 “We declare the national liberation struggle we are waging against the Russian empire to  be  
 henceforth known as jihad aimed at liberation from the infidel’s slavery. We, Muslim nationalists,  
 are launching a struggle for the creation of an Islamic state in Tatarstan.”133  
 
 Ittifaq advocates total and complete independence for Tatarstan, hoping that it 
will one day regain the glory of the "Tatar-Mongol Yoke." Ittifaq publishes the 
newspaper, Altyn Urda, meaning "The Golden Horde," and maintains branches in more 
than thirty regions of Tatarstan.134 The group also has a subsidiary youth organization, 
Azatliq, meaning "Freedom."135 Ittifaq's leader, Fauzia Bayramova, is a former co-
chairman of the ATPC and served in the Tatarstan Parliament from 1990 to 1995. In 
1991, Bayramova held a 14-day hunger strike in Kazan protesting the Russian 
presidential elections being held in Tatarstan's territory. This protest was successful in 
pressuring the Tatarstan Parliament, who on May 27, 1991, decided that the Russian 
presidential election would not be held in Tatarstan.136 In October of the same year 
Bayramova said, 
 "The great tragedy is that the [Tatar] nation has lost its pride. Would a nation that has any pride  
 really allow such self-mockery in its history; would it really sell the Russians its language, religion 
 and customs; and would it really accept their much inferior tradition? Would a Tatar who  had any  
 pride really mix his genealogy with that of the enemy? Would a Tatar who had any pride really  
 look on  calmly as his sacred lands were parceled out to others? Would a Tatar who had any  
 pride really toil like a donkey for four centuries, pulling along the Russian newcomers? …Tatar  
 lands form half the Russian territory… It is time to raise the question of joining to Tatarstan the  
 lands that belonged to Tatars of old and where they live now."137  
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 In general, nationalists were a secular movement, but Islam was emphasized as 
part of cultural identity and used to unify ethnic minorities in order to gain public 
support.  The head of the ATPC confirmed the bond between Tatar culture and Islam in 
1991: “The history of Tatar culture and enlightenment, the entire way of life, is closely 
connected to Islam. Therefore, Islam cannot be separate from national policy or from the 
national movement, and is closely connected to and cooperates with them.”138  
 Nur, or "Light," was a moderate political party that advocated secular aspects of 
Muslim identity, economic reforms and tried to work with non-Muslim ethnic groups in 
order to widen its base of support.139 In the 1995 parliamentary elections, Nur won 5% of 
the vote in Tatarstan.140 After the elections, Muslim leaders formed a different political 
party, the Muslims of Russia, which also failed because it could not overcome the 
Muslims' regional, ethnic and political differences. It never gained political capital 
outside of the Volga-Ural region.141  
 In the 1999 parliamentary elections, the Muslim population was politically 
fractured, as some leaders, including Shaimiev, supported Putin and joined the pro-
government party directly. Other Muslim leaders supported the Refakh, or “Welfare” 
movement, which joined the pro-Putin Unity bloc for the December 1999 elections. 
Nationalists critical of Russian military action in Chechnya chose to join 
Chernomyrdin’s, Our Home is Russia bloc.142 Refakh was successful in gaining 5 seats in 
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the Russian Parliament, the first Muslim movement or party to do so.143 No other Muslim 
movements or parties won seats, and Refakh remained without influence in the Duma, 
controlling only 2.5% of all the seats.144 
 In June 1998, Ittifaq and other nationalist groups founded the Muslims of 
Tatarstan movement, which was an alliance between nationalists and former members of 
the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Tatarstan. Gabdulla Galiullin, the former mufti of 
Tatarstan, served as the first chairman, and advocated nationalist policies.145 The 
significance of the creation of this organization was the formalization of the relationship 
between religious authorities and the nationalists, indicative of the radical ideological 
shift that occurred and the many ways the nationalist movements reorganized themselves 
in an attempt to gain power and popularity. 
 
USEFUL NATIONALISM 
 Nationalists cooperated with the Tatarstan government and some were even 
regime members during the early period of autonomy-seeking. In the early 1990's 
Shaimiev's regime was much more sympathetic to the nationalist cause before the 1994 
power-sharing treaty. Once the treaty was signed and the autonomy of Tatarstan was 
codified, Shaimiev alternately marginalized or incited the nationalist groups as was 
politically expedient for his regime. Political scientist and member of the opposition in 
Tatarstan, Vladimir Baliaev, agrees:  
 "I do not think Shaimiev created an ethno-territorial movement. He just played it up. In his time, 
 he was helping the Tatar national movement, making it easier for them to register, finding  
 places for them to meet, finance, etc. He let them, or even ordered directors of enterprises  
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 to bring crowds to the 'Square of Liberty', the central square of Kazan. Then he could literally refer 
 to the 'will of the people.'"146  
 
 Shaimiev walked a dangerous line in manipulating the nationalists to mobilize 
when it benefitted him. The more popular Putin became, the more Shaimiev risked losing 
a confrontation because of overwhelming support for the President, especially if 
Shaimiev looked more authoritarian than Putin.147 Shaimiev manipulated, undermined 
and controlled nationalist movements and opposition groups by forcing their disputes 
with the government into legal and parliamentary procedure.  Shaimiev kept the 
nationalists away from his negotiations, which allowed him to appear more in control of 
his republic and to act as freely as he wished in these negotiations, because there was no 
pressure being asserted by his opposition, through protests or media.  
 From 1989 through 1994, relations were warm between Tatarstan government and 
nationalists, and the regional administration implemented some of nationalists' policies. 
In 1989, Shaimiev, as chairman of Tatarstan’s Council of Ministers, assisted the 
nationalists in expanding their organization, which helped fuel the Russian rancor over 
the ethnic demands for sovereignty. Shaimiev sent a delegation to the first ATPC 
congress and granted the organization access to the Tatarstan media to help it spread its 
message and increase membership outside the republic.148 The aspect of this assistance to 
the ATPC that shows Shaimiev's motives is the effort to expand the organization outside 
the republic. Shaimiev wanted to use the nationalists to put pressure on Russia, at a time 
and in a way that it benefitted him politically.  
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 In the years following 1989, Shaimiev requested help from the ATPC, Ittifaq and 
Azatliq to secure his position as head of the republic. In August 1990, as the Tatarstan 
Parliament was in session to debate the status of Tatarstan within the Russian Federation, 
the nationalist organizations mobilized 50,000 demonstrators to protest outside the 
parliament building. Spurned by this strong showing of public support for independence, 
the Parliament agreed to the autonomy demands favored by Shaimiev. This same protest 
was integral in the passage of the resolution declaring Tatarstan’s sovereignty. Shaimiev 
personally benefitted as well, as the Parliament also created the position of President of 
the Republic. When Shaimiev first ran for President in June 1990, Shaimiev, he was 
endorsed by the ATPC, and was elected overwhelmingly.149  
 During the same period, Tatarstan officials promoted the establishment of a 
Tatarstan Islamic administration separate from the federal Islamic administration, the 
Islamic Spiritual Board of the European Part of Russia and Siberia, or DUMES. The 
Tatar officials were successful, and the Islamic Spiritual Board of the Republic of 
Tatarstan or DUMRT was founded.150 In this instance, Shaimiev's administration adopted 
a policy advocated by the nationalists and successfully convinced the Russian 
government to support it. This method of alternately appeasing both sides, being the 
ultimate opportunist, allowed Shaimiev to be on good terms with the Russians and the 
nationalists. Shaimiev was adept at picking his battles and manipulating the perceptions 
of his political counterparts so that they saw him as reasonable and open to negotiation. 
By playing both sides like this, Shaimiev avoided the cessation of negotiations with the 
Kremlin, punitive actions or even military force. Shaimiev also avoided inciting more 
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support for nationalist movements that could have resulted in him being removed from or 
voted out of office. Worse yet, aggravating the nationalists could have resulted in 
violence within Tatarstan from the small number of extreme nationalists. Shaimiev was 
successful in avoiding all of these negative outcomes and consolidating power under him 
to ensure stability. 
 With the first successes against Russia in the quest for autonomy, Shaimiev began 
to back off his support for the nationalists' causes. Once the nationalists no longer 
received their political and material support from Shaimiev's regime, they became 
politically irrelevant.151 As an attempt to become more relevant and have a place in the 
Republic's political debate, the groups' positions moved more to the extreme, and their 
actions became more violent. In October 1991, the nationalists held a large rally in front 
of Tatarstan’s Parliament building marking the anniversary of the Russian conquering of 
Kazan. The protestors demanded that the parliament adopt a declaration of independence.  
This rally turned violent when the protesters tried to storm the Parliament building.152  
 The platforms of Ittifaq and the Milli Mejlis became more extremist and pan-
Islamist. In January 1996, the Milli Mejlis adopted an unofficial Tatar constitution that 
included the revival of sharia as law in the republic. Although the Milli Mejlis wanted 
sharia to be as interpreted in the moderate (Jadidist) interpretation, this was still a drastic 
swing toward extreme nationalism, and shows the desperation the groups were feeling.153 
The movement may have advocated sharia because they believed an increase in Muslim 
religiosity would increase the population's connection to their Tatar heritage and fuel 
nationalism. Unfortunately for the nationalists, these changes resulted in the opposite of 
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the desired effect. Public support declined greatly due to the increasingly violent rhetoric 
and protests, which was shunned by the Tatar population.  
 While the Shaimiev government did not officially support this increasingly radical 
behavior, there is evidence that the regime incited nationalist groups to intensify their 
activities, which the regime then used as a bargaining chip with Moscow. The Russian 
government was wary of nationalist movements in the republics, and therefore needed the 
help of Shaimiev to appease them. In 1999, Shaimiev's government instigated a rise in 
nationalist sentiment to prepare for the expiration of the power-sharing treaty the same 
year. If the regime could cause a mild separatist or nationalist protest, then the Russian 
authorities might be more willing to extend the republic's benefits past the expiration of 
the power-sharing treaty. On September 15, 1998, Zaki Zainullin, an academic 
nicknamed the "Tatar Dudaev," in homage to the violent leader of the Chechen 
separatists organized a visible yet ineffective protest in front of the government building 
on Kazan's Square of Freedom without interference from the Shaimiev regime. Signs at 
the protest read "Shame to the Government of Tatarstan," "Tatarstan does not have 
sovereignty" and "the Tatar language should be the only state language of Tatarstan." Not 
only was this protest permitted by the government, but in early 1999, Zainullin was 
promoted to leader of the ATPC, most likely at the request of the government.154  
 During the Putin presidency, nationalist activities did not have as much verve or 
public support as they did during Yeltsin's time in office, yet there were still protests and 
active political campaigns. Only weeks after Putin announced the federal districts and 
Presidential envoys, the ATPC staged republic-wide rallies and burned copies of a map of 
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the seven federal districts.155 Annually on "Memory Day", which marks the fall of Kazan 
to Ivan IV in 1552, ATPC and Azatliq held rallies on Kazan’s Freedom Square, burning 
effigies of Ivan the Terrible and delivering anti-Russian and anti-Shaimiev speeches. In 
October 2001, this rally attracted over 2,000 demonstrators.156 
 
UNDERMINING THE OPPOSITION 
 Shaimiev has exercised tight control over the opposition voices in Tatarstan, by 
absorbing key nationalist leaders into the administration, creating duplicate organizations, 
using bureaucratic "red-tape", incorporating nationalist ideology into regime policy and 
infringing on free speech. Shaimiev also has tightly controlled the members of his own 
government, especially if they took action without his approval. In 1995, Tatar officials 
periodically seized mosques and other religious facilities that were controlled by an 
unsanctioned Mufti. The appointed head of the government-sponsored Congress of 
Tatarstani Muslims, Mufti Gabdulla Galiulla, attempted to, on his own, seize a mosque 
and madrassa in Kazan. Since he was not acting on explicit orders from the regime, 
Galiulla was arrested.157  In general, the regime policy allows the removal of officials 
who associate with or support nationalist groups.158 
 Tatarstan's government undermined the nationalist groups by co-opting key 
leaders, who were asked to become part of the Shaimiev administration. In September 
1989, Shaimiev, serving as first secretary of Tatarstan’s Communist Party obkom 
(regional organization), appointed Rafael Khakimov, a key ATPC leader, to the position 
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of deputy head of the ideology department of the obkom, or Communist Party regional 
organization.159  Khakimov later became a chief advisor to Shaimiev and a leader in his 
political party.160 
 The government also created duplicate organizations to undermine the role of 
opposition groups in Tatar society. As a counterweight to the Milli Mejlis, the Tatarstan 
government sponsored All-Tatar World Congress, led by Indus Tagirov and representing 
Tatar communities worldwide. The All-Tatar World Congress endorsed Shaimiev’s 
strategy of negotiation with Moscow and rejected the nationalists' demands that Shaimiev 
declare total independence.161 On the religious front, the regime began to promote an 
increased role for Islam in politics, imitating the nationalist use of Islam to unify public 
support. In 1998 Shaimiev named Gusman Iskhakov Mufti of Tatarstan and held the 
Congress of Tatarstan Muslims. A key reason for selecting Iskhakov was his political 
benefit to the Shaimiev administration. The Mufti wanted Kazan to become the Islamic 
capital of Eurasia, which would bring more notoriety and political power to the republic's 
leadership. Iskhov also wanted to take Muslim support from Mufti Talgat Tadjuddinov, 
head of the (federal) Spiritual Administration in Ufa, Bashkortostan. By undermining the 
control of Tadjuddinov over the Muslim population in favor of his hand-picked Mufti, 
Shaimiev further consolidated the politics of the republic.162  
 The Shaimiev regime co-opted aspects of the nationalists' ideological program as 
a way of minimizing the popular support of these groups. The regime chose the most 
reasonable, attainable and popular aspects of the nationalists' demands and added it to 
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their policy agenda. In particular, they advocated for a distinct Tatarstan citizenship and 
the spread of the Tatar "brand" of Islam, EuroIslam. In April 1997, Tatarstan’s Academy 
of Sciences recommended to the regime that the alphabet of the Tatar language be 
switched from the Cyrillic to Latin alphabet. In July 1997, the State Council passed a law 
introducing a Latin-based Tatar alphabet, a move intended to bring the republic closer to 
Europe and farther from Russian culture and media.163  
 The regime also implemented previously "nationalist" policies regarding 
education and the expansion of Islamic institutions, such as mosques, universities and 
madrassas.164 Beginning in 1994, Shaimiev's administration built Tatar schools, an 
Academy of Sciences, and a Tatar University.165 Tatar officials "borrowed" the sentiment 
of nationalist rhetoric, but removed the extreme language. For example, Tatar official 
would never use the words "independence" or "secession" in public.166  
 "Tatarization" was the general policy of the republic's government to promote 
Tatar dominance in all aspects of society, economy and politics. Officially, these policies 
were an essential part of nation-building, and an effort to raise the sophistication of Tatar 
culture equal to that of the Russian residents of Tatarstan.167 Tatar dominance was vital 
for Shaimiev, because it allowed him to keep Russians from gaining a foothold in his 
administration and appease the Tatar population, who although they may not be members 
of nationalist organizations, are sensitive to any trend of "Russification."  
 In authoritarian Tatarstan, voices that cannot be co-opted, appeased or made 
irrelevant in public opinion are silenced through authoritarian means. The government 
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manipulated the registration process for groups to undermine their ability to operate. In 
the heyday of Shaimiev's support for nationalists, Ittifaq, the Milli Mejlis and ATPC were 
given very nice offices in the center of Kazan. Years later, they were forced to leave these 
locations, as a way of undermining their ability to conduct business. The government, 
claiming it was acting in the interest of stability, denied registration for political 
organizations whose platforms were pro-independence. Without registration, these groups 
and their activities were illegal.168  
 Fauziya Bairamova, whose one-time popularity is demonstrated by her title, 
"Tatar Woman of the Year, 1990", had her organization's office closed by the republic's 
authorities in 1996. The same year, her group's newspaper, Golden Horde was shut 
down.169 According to the authorities, the newspaper was banned because it did not 
comply with a technicality of the federal law on the press: Golden Horde published in 
Tatar and Russian, even though it was registered as a Tatar-language newspaper. The 
actual reason was most likely the publication's opposition to the Tatar government.170 The 
government has also closed the Kazanskii Telegraph, Suverenitet, and Kris newspapers. 
Closing Ittifaq's newspaper, Golden Horde, dealt a severe blow to the nationalists who 
relied on this newspaper as their main media outlet and was a unifier for the multiple 
organizations. Tatarstan Parliamentary Deputy F. Saifullin charges that Shaimiev's 
government has tried to depoliticize the media in Tatarstan, leading to degradation of 
information in the republic so that it now is only "Tatar village folklore", dancing, 
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singing, festivals, gardening, etc.171 The elimination of all ideological content makes the 
control of public political opinion much easier.  
 
ISLAMIC RADICALISM 
 While nationalists pose the greatest challenge for Shaimiev's authoritarianism, 
Islamic radicals have tried to gain public support in Tatarstan. These groups have been 
unsuccessful thus far, but some scholars and officials predict that radical Islamic 
movements will grow in the future. Sergei Kirienko, former presidential envoy to the 
Volga Federal District, said that there was a need to pre-empt radical Islam by 
strengthening traditional sects in the Volga. He was concerned that Russian Muslims 
might return from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries, trained in spreading 
radical ideologies.172 Whether or not these fears are founded, Shaimiev's control of the 
republic is considered very useful to the Russian authorities because of the reduction in 
radical Islamic activity. The Russian government has been concerned about its 
predominately Muslim regions becoming recruiting grounds or safe havens for terrorists, 
but Shaimiev has thus far kept the influence and presence of radical Islamic groups to a 
minimum in Tatarstan.  
 The few incidents reported in the republic include a plot the government claims to 
have thwarted, which would have attacked Kazan on New Year's Eve 2000. The most 
prominent incident was the explosion of a gas pipeline near Kukmor in December 
1999.173 The men accused of the crime were students of the Yolduz Medressah in 
Naberezhnie Chelny, a hotbed of anti-Russian sentiment. They explained their motives 
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as, “Dagestanis from Karamakhi asked us to help [our] Islamic brothers fighting in 
Chechnya. They said that if we blew up the gas pipeline, the Western public would take 
notice of the war.”174 The authorities investigated multiple claims of extremism in 
Naberezhniye Chelny and closed a madrassa in the city because it taught religious 
extremism.175  
The regime takes a very strong stance on Islamic radicalism. Anyone considered a 
radical Islamist is arrested by the government, and it is not clear if they are criminally 
tried, jailed or killed. In 2004 and 2005, members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami party (the 
Party of Islamic Liberation) were arrested. Russian human rights groups charged that 
some of the charges were falsified and the suspects were tortured.176 This harsh position 
is not hidden by the Tatar government. Shaimiev, speaking at a republic Security Council 
meeting, said that the government could drive a bulldozer over the radical madrassa in 
Naberezhniye Chelny, to wipe it off the face of the earth, but that this would not solve the 
problem, since the radicals would simply go underground.177 Such harsh rhetoric is 
indicative of the lengths the regime is willing to go to ensure that Tatarstan is seen as a 
republic that is not host to Islamic radicalism.  Rafael Khakimov, policy adviser and 
"spin doctor" for Shaimiev, was quite open to the foreign media about the government's 
method of dealing with Islamic radicalism. "We had some Wahhabis here in Tatarstan, 
but we don't have them now. It may not have been very democratic but we just got rid of 
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them."178 This hard-line position is designed to protect Shaimiev's power and gain favor 
with the federal authorities.  
 Shaimiev and his regime work hard to promote an image of Tatarstan as a place 
on the cutting edge of cooperation and peace. Tatarstan is promoted as a mediator 
between Moscow and restive regions, and internationally, as an example of resolving 
territorial and secessionist disputes. However, Tatarstan is a true authoritarian republic, 
and it is obvious. "I think the regime does not feel very confident, and even minor 
criticism generates strong displeasure…The authoritarian regime has never ended here," 
said Damir Iskhakov, a Tatar ethnologist at Institute of History in Kazan.179 This 
authoritarianism is an essential component of how the process by which Tatarstan 
achieved more sovereignty than other republics. By controlling dissent within his 
territory, Shaimiev can act convincingly as popular ethnic leader, and can offer the 
federal government a tranquil, stable Tatarstan. 
 Through regional authoritarianism, the Shaimiev government maintained stability 
by controlling electoral procedures, government institutions, media and opposition 
groups. This allowed Tatarstan and Russia to come to an agreement which granted 
Tatarstan an unprecedented level of autonomy. Control over the population of his 
republic and the ability to incite anti-Kremlin sentiment were tools used by Shaimiev to 
make his leadership valuable to the Russian government. Stability ensured by Shaimiev 
during a period where many regions threatened separatism, was of great benefit to the 
Russian leaders, who in turn worked with Shaimiev to keep him in power and agree to 
Tatar autonomy.  
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CHAPTER 4 
ASYMMETRIC AUTONOMY IN RUSSIA'S REPUBLICS 
 
 Autonomy is difficult to define, and even more difficult to measure, yet scholars 
agree that Tatarstan enjoys an unprecedented level of autonomy within the Russian 
Federation. The republic retained the majority of control over tax revenues, retaining 
approximately 50% more than other republics. Tatarstan also had some control over the 
use of its considerable natural resources and had the legal ability to establish foreign 
economic relations. Even in the language used in its power-sharing treaty, Tatarstan is the 
only republic described as a "state unified with the Russian Federation."180 This thesis has 
shown that Tatarstan negotiated this high level of autonomy through a combination of 
authoritarian control and taking advantage of elite networks. (this is trust?) 
 The twenty-one other ethnic republics of the Russian Federation are ideal for 
testing this hypothesis. These republics have similar histories: they were forced into the 
Russian or Soviet empires, administered as ASSR's of the Soviet Union, and struggled to 
find their place in the chaotic post-Communist transition. The similar historic background 
and commonality of all being homelands of ethnic minority groups eliminates the 
necessity to consider history and minority status as causes. The Soviet structure of 
regions' units was continued after the establishment of the Russian Federation. The three 
distinct levels of federal subjects, in descending autonomy, were republics, followed by 
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krais, oblasts and significant cities, then autonomous okrugs and oblasts, with 89 federal 
subjects in all.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Republics of the Russian Federation181 
  
 The relationship between the center and periphery was established by the 1992 
Federative Agreement and the 1993 Russian Constitution. Tatarstan and Chechnya 
refused to sign the 1992 Agreement therefore they had some legality to claim that they 
were not bound by the Russian Constitution. The other 19 republics signed the 1992 
agreement, but some of these did not want to be bound by the terms enumerated within 
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these documents. The 1993 Russian Constitution (which modified the 1992 document), 
made all the federal subjects legally equal, turning Russia's asymmetric federalism into a 
symmetric one. This symmetry was short-lived, as the next year, beginning with 
Tatarstan, the regions began to sign bilateral treaties with Russia.182 
 Any region that had the same level of autonomy as the 1993 Russian Constitution 
was given jointly held control over the republic's natural resources and the ability to 
decide on their form of governance, including constitutions, but they were definitively 
not sovereign entities.183 Regions could increase their autonomy by negotiating a bilateral 
treaty with the federal authorities, and about half the republics eventually signed bilateral 
treaties with Russia, allowing them rights in additional to the basic rights of all republics. 
The federal structure has continued to develop through agreements and court rulings, but 
these bilateral treaties are the most substantial and binding amendments to the 1992 
Agreement and the 1993 Russian Constitution.  
 From the beginning, the Russian Constitution was vague enough to allow 
interpretation and inconsistent treatment of the regions by the center. For example, the 
provision allowing the establishment of the republic's choice of governmental system is 
not completely clear. Bashkortostan and Russia signed an annex to clarify that the 
republic could establish an independent legislature.184 Adygeya, on the other hand, had to 
fight a legal battle with the federal government to retain its bicameral legislature, while 
several other republics had similar bicameral bodies and were not being pursued.185 
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 The numerous addenda agreements, treaties, etc. resulted in a very asymmetrical 
federal system that had succeeded in providing the flexibility needed to stabilize the 
diversity of regional characters, interests and needs.  This asymmetry resulted, however 
in the complication of jealousy between regional leaders over the differences between the 
privileges allowed. For example, some treaties and agreements signed by the republics 
with Moscow outlined percentages of natural resources that they controlled or the 
proportion of federal tax revenues that remained in the republic. Republics could very 
easily see another treaty as unfair. For this reason, many later bilateral agreements were 
secret.186 The process of federalism is dynamic and ongoing, as has been seen in Russia, 
with some observers viewing federalism as a process rather than a system, a constantly 
changing relationship between the center and periphery.187  
 This chapter will analyze the remaining factors that are often considered to cause 
asymmetry in levels of autonomy. The factors that play a major role in the federal-
republic autonomy negotiation are economic potential, presence of natural resources, 
external borders, and the concentration of the titular nationality. P.J. Soderlund isolates 
these same factors as influences on the bargaining process, referring to them as territory 
(borders), strength of ethnicity (population), and economic strength (natural resources). 
Soderlund's study is focused on the presence of these resource "bargaining chips" in 
correspondence to how quickly a bilateral treaty was signed. Soderlund's study, which 
includes all the treaties signed with Russian regional governments, (not only republics), 
shows the combination of factors that would best facilitate a quick negotiation process. 
This assessment that the first treaties were the most liberal is an astute and compelling 
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assessment, but overall, Soderlund misses the mark on the important question of the 
mechanisms at work in the republics, focusing instead on a more superficial survey of 
regional characteristics. The factors that Soderlund has identified do play a role in the 
bargaining process, but not directly. These factors guide the incentives of regional and 
federal elites in a specific direction regarding each republic. This chapter will show how 
these factors alone do not affect the outcome of the autonomy negotiations.188  
 Each characteristic, borders, population and natural resources, will be analyzed by 
comparing ethnic republics of the Russian Federation, in an effort to demonstrate why 
each factor cannot explain the republics' diverse levels of autonomy. This process will 
show that trust between elites and authoritarianism within the republics resulted in the 
highest levels of autonomy among Russia's ethnic republics. If the dynamic of trust and 
authoritarianism leads to a high level of autonomy, then one would expect to see those 
republics lacking one or both of these factors to have achieved a lower level of autonomy. 
Similarly, other republics whose political dynamics included trust and authoritarianism 
will have achieved a level of autonomy closest to Tatarstan's.  
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Table 1. Level of Autonomy189 
 
Republic Name Bilateral Treaty Autonomy 
Bashkortostan August 3, 1994 High 
Sakha June 29, 1995 High 
Tatarstan February 15, 1994 High 
Buryatia July 11, 1995 Moderate 
Chuvashia May 27, 1996 Moderate 
Kabardino-Balkaria July 1, 1994 Moderate 
Komi March 20, 1996 Moderate 
Mari El May 20, 1998 Moderate 
North Ossetia March 23, 1995 Moderate 
Udmurtia October 17, 1995 Moderate 
Adygeya No Low 
Altai No Low 
Chechnya No Low 
Dagestan No Low 
Ingushetia No Low 
Kalmykia No Low 
Karachay-Cherkessia No Low 
Karelia No Low 
Khakassia No Low 
Mordovia No Low 
Tuva No Low 
  
 For the purposes of this study, autonomy will be assessed by the amount of areas 
of governance over which the republic has control, and the relative importance of these 
areas. For example, a republic's ability to conduct foreign economic relations leads to a 
greater degree of autonomy than the ability to put the titular nationality on passports. 
Attention will also be paid to the legal wording of the agreement with Russia, though 
with the understanding that de jure and de facto do not always coincide in the Russian 
Federation.  
 All the Federation republics, except Tatarstan and Chechnya, signed the federal 
treaty in 1992, this agreement was a starting point for autonomy. It stated the rights that 
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were reserved to the republics, but in order to exercise them, the republics would have to 
act in accordance with federal law and jurisdictional conflicts would be settled by the 
federal Constitutional Court. The treaty was vague about the republics' rights regarding 
the use of natural resources. Republics were granted the right to engage in external trade 
and relations.190 In general, these rights did not satisfy the republics, and some republics, 
like Tatarstan, negotiated bilateral treaties that enhanced their rights and thereby 
expanded autonomy.  
 Autonomy, or the freedom to choose one's own actions, will be defined as high, 
moderate or low, based on the de jure concessions of rights that the republics won from 
the Russian Federation, and when it is different from their de jure rights, the republic's de 
facto rights. The twenty-one republics are categorized according to their level of 
autonomy relative to the others. A bilateral treaty is a main indicator of high autonomy, 
but the exact level also depends on the rights exercised by the republic, primarily, control 
over tax revenues, natural resources, the ability to engage in foreign economic relations, 
and control over state institutions in their territory.  Soderlund evaluates the success of 
republics (and all regional administrative divisions) at using their resources in the 
bargaining process with the Russian center. He evaluates their success based on how 
early they were able to sign a bilateral treaty with the Russian Federation, assuming that 
the earliest treaties yielded more rights to the republics, an assumption also supported by 
Filippov and Shvetsova.191 While this is true to some extent, it is certainly not a hard and 
fast rule, primarily because within the republics who signed bilateral treaties, there were 
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great disparities in autonomy level, and timing has proven to not be a reliable indicator of 
autonomy. For example, Sakha, one of the most autonomous republics, signed its 
bilateral treaty nearly a year after Kabardino-Balkaria, which won far fewer concessions.  
 Evaluating the de jure and de facto levels of autonomy in the republics is a 
challenge. The dynamic nature of the relationship between Russia's center and regions is 
constantly changing, and not very well reported (this is sometimes done by design). The 
time frame over which the negotiation process took place complicates the selection of a 
time period to compare; indeed, some republics consider their treaty negotiations 
ongoing. In order to make this analysis as accurate as possible, evaluations of autonomy 
are centered on the time when the majority of the republics signed treaties, 1994-1998. 
Additionally, the assumption is that a bilateral treaty granted a republic more autonomy 
than it would have had without one, since basic rights were enumerated in the 1992 
Federative Agreement and the 1993 Russian Constitution.   
 Republics categorized as having high autonomy have control over vital aspects of 
their economies as well and enjoy additional rights relating to other jurisdictional areas.  
Not all republics that signed bilateral treaties have high levels of autonomy, but the three 
republics that enjoy this freedom, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Sakha, all signed bilateral 
treaties.  
 The Republic of Sakha has a high level of autonomy including broad control over 
its budget and diamond resources, military service of its citizens, and is able to retain 
revenue from local taxes. 192 The ability to keep the republic's tax revenue in the republic 
is a unique provision in Sakha's bilateral treaty. The federal government agreed to let 
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Sakha's government use the amount that would normally be sent to Moscow in the 
republic to support the federal facilities and institutions there.193 This arrangement 
benefitted the republic greatly because, as one of the wealthiest republics, it was able to 
have better federal services in the republic. The relationship between the federal center 
and Sakha is evident in the language used to describe the republic, as "a state conforming 
to the Constitution of the Russian Federation," a strong statement in support of Sakha's 
autonomy and its status as a "state" that has chosen to enter the federation willingly.194  
 Bashkortostan's bilateral treaty is perhaps the closest to Tatarstan's, and contains 
similar tax-exemptions to Tatarstan and Sakha,195 significant control over Bashkortostan's 
budget, and the right to establish republican national banks. Regarding non-fiscal matters, 
Bashkortostan secured the right to decide whether to participate in military actions, to 
select its own prosecutorial and judicial personnel.196  
 Those republics evaluated to have moderate autonomy have additional autonomy 
than the amount described in the 1992 Federative Agreement and the 1993 Russian 
Constitution, all of them achieving this status through a bilateral treaty. The difference 
between a moderate level of autonomy or a high level of autonomy is that they do not 
have the broad or complete control over natural resources, federal tax revenue or republic 
budgets. A moderate level of autonomy typically is characterized by the ability to control 
their republic's system of governance and to conduct foreign economic relations. These 
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republics are: Kabardino-Balkaria, Komi, Buryatia, Chuvashia, Mari El, North Ossetia, 
and Udmurtia. 
 The republican leadership in Kabardino-Balkaria signed a bilateral treaty in many 
ways similar to Tatarstan's,197 and was able to get concessions from Moscow so that 
Kabardino-Balkaria now enjoys the status of "Tax-free Zone", which has encouraged 
foreign investment and developed the economy.198 These concessions allow them 
considerably more ability to deal with foreign countries than other republics, particularly 
those which did not sign a bilateral treaty. Like Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, Kabardino-
Balkaria asserted autonomy regarding military issues, not abiding by the Commonwealth 
of Independent States' (CIS) sanctions of Abkhazia in 1996.199 Nevertheless, the republic 
is categorized as having moderate autonomy because its powers are significantly less than 
the aforementioned republics with high autonomy levels. Kabardino-Balkaria did not win 
the same far-reaching tax-benefits as these republics, and Constitutional Court rulings 
have struck down republican policies on population movement, unlike rulings pertaining 
to Sakha.200 Even the legal language of their bilateral treaties, shows the moderate level 
of autonomy achieved by Kabardino-Balkaria, which is described as "a state within the 
Russian Federation," implying that Kabardino-Balkaria is a subordinate unit of the 
Federation.201  
 The wording of the Komi bilateral treaty clearly indicates its moderate level of 
autonomy. The description of Komi implies the subordinate position of the republic, "a 
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region of the Russian Federation." By contrast, Tatarstan is referred to as "a state united 
with the Russian Federation."202 Komi was unable to gain the rights that Sakha and 
Tatarstan did regarding tax revenues and republic budgets, but it is able to have foreign 
economic relations, which it does with more than 40 foreign countries.203 Like 
Bashkortostan, Komi has in its bilateral treaty the specific provision, that it can establish 
institutions of self-governance, but only according to Russian Federal law.204 This still 
gives the right to establish self-governance, which was not as firm for those republics 
without a bilateral treaty. The Constitutional Court, as in Kabardino-Balkaria, did not 
allow Komi to systematically favor the titular nationality. An election commission had 
refused to register a candidate in elections for the Komi state council because it did not 
have a permanent registration, but this action was struck down and the court ruled that the 
electoral law only requires the candidate to have residency, (different from registration 
and in some cases easier to obtain).205 In 1997 and 1998, the Russian Constitutional Court 
tried to overturn republican laws on local government in both Komi and Udmurtia. In the 
1998 incident, the Komi government asserted that local forms of government were the 
jurisdiction of his republican government. The year before, the leadership of Udmurtia 
refused to obey this same ruling, making similar jurisdictional objections. Ultimately, 
however, Udmurtian government was forced to accept the ruling.  
 Chuvashia enjoys a level of autonomy similar to that of Kabardino-Balkaria and 
Komi, due to sanctioned corporate tax incentives and the ability to have trade relations 
                                                      
202
 Prendergrast, There are Republics and then there are Republics: Who Matters?, 7. 
203
 Ross, Federalism and Democratisation in Russia, 141. 
204
 Russian Constitution, Annotated, 289. 
205
 Russian Constitution, Annotated. 
 78 
 
with over 60 foreign countries.206 Another similarity is the way the republic's autonomy 
has been curtailed by the Constitutional Court, especially regarding Chuvashia's electoral 
laws.207 
 Buryatia does not have as many economic advantages as Komi and Kabardino-
Balkaria, but was able to achieve the right to declare a state of emergency.208 Buryatia for 
an abnormal number of years resisted the federal government requiring changes to their 
Constitution, such as the provision that presidential candidates know both Russian and 
the republic's native Buryat.209  
 Republics categorized as having "low" autonomy have not signed a bilateral 
treaty, which means that by law, they have only the autonomy described in the 1992 and 
1993 documents. These republics can exercise similar rights to those in the "moderate" 
category, but those with low autonomy only exercise these rights with the permission of 
the federal government. Some of these republics seem to act with impunity, exerting a 
moderate level of autonomy over such issues as system of governance and republican 
budgets, but these tend to be the smallest republics, and their autonomous actions are 
ignored by Moscow, because they have so little bearing on the Federation. Still, any 
autonomous actions these republics can "get away with" are de facto, and attempts to 
codify this autonomy (through local legislation, interference with federal tax revenue or 
agreements with foreign entities) usually elicits a response from federal authorities. 
Republics with these characteristics and "low" autonomy include Kalmykia, Mordovia, 
and Khakassia.  
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 Other republics find that the Russian government is very involved in local 
politics, which is most likely motivated by the Russian government's incentive to keep all 
the republics as close to the Kremlin as possible, politically. An easy way to do this is for 
Russian interests to be injected into government, which is also a simple way for the 
federal center to monitor the stability of the regions. This was the case in Adygeya, as 
well as Altai Republic and Karelia.  
 Some republics with low autonomy had very different experiences during the 
negotiation periods. These republics were so embroiled in territorial and ethnic conflict 
that they did not engage as much in negotiation with the federal government as with 
themselves. These republics are all located in the Caucasus, and have at times relied on 
the stability of the Russian government to keep their republics together, very opposite 
from pushing for autonomy. These republics are: Ingushetia, Dagestan and Karachay-
Cherkessia. Finally, Tuva and Chechnya were embroiled in conflict also, but as a result 
of their own separatist desires. Since they are still in the Russian federation, it is clear that 
they did not achieve a high level of autonomy, and in fact, both have low autonomy, 
which allows the federal government to better maintain control.  
 Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, President of Kalmykia since 1993, is perhaps the most 
irrational and interesting politician in Russia today, a chess fanatic who openly admires 
dictators and believes that he was abducted by extraterrestrials. He has, according to 
many observers, squandered the finances of his small republic by building a "Chess City" 
complex, which is barely inhabited and luxurious in one of the poorest Russian republics. 
Kalmykia has a low level of autonomy, having not signed a bilateral treaty, and because 
the federal government has few interests in this region, the regime is essentially left 
 80 
 
alone. Kalmykia has a higher level of de facto autonomy than most other republics 
categorized as having "low" levels of autonomy, but the Kalmyk president does not 
distance himself from Kremlin policies, he mimics them. In fact, in March 1994, less than 
a year after being elected, Ilyumzhinov abolished the Kalmykian Constitution and 
decreed that only the basic Russian law would rule. The Constitution was replaced later, 
but Kalmykia lost most of its autonomy because it did not have any of its own laws.210 If 
autonomy is defined as the ability control one's actions, then without a constitution, a 
government cannot set a course different from the rest of the federation.  
 In general, Ilyumzhinov sought the favor of the federal leadership, and in the 
1990's he supported the integrity of the Russian Federation, bucking the trend of 
sovereignty demands. In 1993 he renounced the republic's sovereignty, which was 
declared years earlier.211 Despite the Kalmykian regime's accepting attitude toward 
Russian policy and law, when the President opposed Russian interests he was quickly 
reigned in. In 1998, Ilyumzhinov went on Russian Public television and declared that 
Kalmykia was "de facto, outside of the Russian Federation." He was condemned by the 
Duma and because of fears that he would be removed from office, withdrew his 
statement.212 The Kalmykian situation varies greatly from most other republics in the way 
that the republic supported the unity of the federation, but enjoyed a degree of autonomy 
in the way it was generally ignored by the Russian authorities. Mordovia and Khakassia, 
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also small republics, were largely ignored by the federal authorities, and like Kalmykia, 
rarely opposed the policies of Moscow.213 
 As opposed to the quiet republics, who were more often ignored by the Russia 
authorities, several republics found themselves constantly the object of actions by federal 
authorities which minimized their autonomy. Adygeya has a low level of autonomy 
compared to other republics because of the amount of control the Kremlin exerts over 
local politics. Compared to other ethnic republics, federal law violations in Adygeya's 
Constitution and bilateral treaty have been more vigorously pursued than those of other 
republics. The federal government did not let Adygeya have a bicameral parliament even 
though ones existed in at least four other republics.214 Most clearly demonstrating the low 
level of autonomy in Adygeya is the fact that the republican government's most serious 
concern is the potential that they will be forcibly merged with the Krasnodar Region, 
thereby losing all autonomy.215 
 Similarly, the Altai Republic has low autonomy and more federal intrusion into 
republican affairs than in other republics. The Constitutional Court has ruled several 
times on the structure of the Altai republican government, including a ruling that 
republican officials could not appoint to the federal agencies located in their territory, a 
right that other republics, such as Bashkortostan, did enjoy. Overall, there have been a 
unusually high number of rulings in the Russian Constitutional Court regarding the Altai 
Republic.216 
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 Several of the republics with the lowest levels of autonomy struggled with ethnic 
conflict through the years, when other republics were negotiating autonomy agreements 
with Moscow. These republics, including Dagestan, Ingushetia and Karachay-Cherkessia 
are all located in the Caucasus, and during the negotiation period and after, had low 
autonomy levels because they relied on the Russian government to help reduce conflict 
and increase stability.  
 Ingushetia was war-torn from 1992-1994 so its status and borders was 
undetermined until later than most other republics. The republic has been an "offshore 
economic zone", since 1994, enabling Russian companies to register there and avoid 
taxes, but this potential indicator of autonomy was done only with Russian permission.217 
Dagestan is not trying to get as much autonomy as it can from the federal government; it 
is more concerned about subsidies, which it could not survive without.218 Karachay-
Cherkessia was struggling to keep its republic unified between opposing Karachay and 
Cherkessian ethnic groups, and feared igniting ethnic violence throughout the Caucasus.  
 These three republics suffered through violent years while others negotiated for 
autonomy. Tuva and Chechnya also experienced violence, but it was typically in lieu of 
negotiations for autonomy. Tuva and Chechnya were the only republics to, during the key 
negotiation period, have their Chair of Parliament and President, respectively, be the 
leaders of nationalist organizations.219 There were clashes between Russians and Tuvans 
in 1990 and sporadic inter-ethnic violence, but not to the level seen in Chechnya. Tuva 
originally passed a constitution that negated the Russian constitution's privatization of 
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land, gave the republic the right to override a federal declaration of a state of emergency, 
the right to appoint their own prosecutors and judges, and to deny any military 
appointments in the republic.220  The constitution also had within it the right to secede 
from the Russian Federation in the case of "an emergency situation or a political and state 
crisis in the Russian Federation."221 The Congress of Tuva was eventually forced to 
amend these differences in order to bring the republic's Constitution in line with the 
Russian Constitution. The original Tuvan constitution granted the republic the right to 
self-determination and secession from the Russian Federation, and was edited only after a 
rancorous negotiation. In other republics, constitutional debates yielded measurable 
successes for the republic, but the Tuvan constitutional debate was solved by granting the 
republic's politicians the right "to express their attitudes towards the decisions of the 
federal bodies of power and the bodies of state power of the constituent parts of the 
Russian Federation on the question of war and peace in conflict situations, threatening the 
life and security of citizens."222  
 Chechnya is a case that is different from the other republics regarding autonomy 
negotiations because it is still considered by some, to be negotiating a power-sharing 
treaty with Moscow. For the purposes of this analysis, it is considered a state with a low 
level of autonomy, as it does not legally have the same rights as most other republics. As 
of 2007, the negotiations of a bilateral treaty were stalled over the issue of which federal 
                                                      
220
 Steven L. Solnick, "Federal Bargaining in Russia," East European Constitutional Review 52, no. 4 
(1995), 53. 
221
 Yelena Tregubova, "Nationalities Ministry Conducts Review of Regional Constitutions," Sevodnya (21 
October 1994, 1994). 
222
  "Chronology for Tuvinians in Russia," Minorities at Risk Project, UNHCR, 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/chronology.asp?groupId=36537 (accessed 14 May 2009). 
 84 
 
level will control the use of natural resources, and Chechnya's desire to be a "special 
economic zone" to attract investment.223 
Table 2. Economic Potential/Natural Resources224 
 
Republic Name National Rank National Resources Overall 
Economic 
Potential 
Level of 
Autonomy 
Bashkortostan 22 (High) 60.9% (High) High High 
Sakha (Yakutia) 1 (High) 85.0% (High) High High 
Tatarstan 21 (High) 56.2% (High) High High 
Buryatia 31 (Moderate) 29.5% (Moderate) Moderate Moderate 
Chuvashia 72 (Low) 12.1% (Low) Low Moderate 
Kabardino-
Balkaria 74 (Low) 
11.5% (Low) Low Moderate 
Komi 35 (Moderate) 84.4% (High) High Moderate 
Mari El 55 (Moderate) 19.9% (Low) Moderate Moderate 
North Ossetia 63 (Low) 26.4% (Low) Low Moderate 
Udmurtia 45 (Moderate) 38.7% (Moderate) Moderate Moderate 
Adygeya 49 (Moderate) 26.3% (Low) Moderate Low 
Altai 60 (Low) 27.3% (Low) Low Low 
Chechnya No Data No Data No Data Low 
Dagestan 78 (Low) 30.4% (Moderate) Low Low 
Ingushetia No Data 66.1% (High) N/A Low 
Kalmykia 76 (Low) 45.1% (Moderate) Low Low 
Karachay-
Cherkessia 75 (Low) 
36.5% (Moderate) Low Low 
Karelia 13 (High) 66.8% (High) High Low 
Khakassia 4 (High) 59.5% (High) High Low 
Mordovia 73 (Low) 13.2% (Low) Low Low 
Tuva 65 (Low) 46.5% (Moderate) Moderate Low 
 
 A republic's economic potential, frequently measured by the amount of natural 
resources found within its territory, is frequently analyzed as a major factor in the level of 
autonomy achieved by Russian Federation republics. Proponents of this hypothesis state 
those republics richer in natural resources or with strong economies are less reliant on the 
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Russian government, and they use their resources as bargaining tools when negotiating 
with the federal government.225 However, a republic may be rich in natural resources but 
landlocked and unable to sell or process their resources without the cooperation of the 
federal government, weakening their ability to use the resources as a bargaining chip.  
 Bert Van Selm analyzed the economic performance of the 89 regions using 
Goskomstat data from 1995 to score and rank each region based on the leading economic 
indicators of unemployment, income, and industrial production. The republics are 
categorized according to where they fall in this range: ranks 1-29 are categorized as 
"high", ranks 30-59 are "moderate" and ranks 60-89 are "low." The amount of natural 
resources is also important to economic potential and some theories of autonomy 
negotiation. In this analysis natural resources are measured by resource industries as a 
percentage of industrial production in 2001226. The republics are ranked by thirds, 0-29% 
are considered "low" natural resources republics, 30-55% "moderate", and 56-85% 
"high." When the economic rank and amount of natural resources indicated different 
levels of economic potential, the place within each range was considered to determine an 
overall rating of "high", "moderate" or "low." Some data was unavailable because of the 
conflicts in Ingushetia and Chechnya during the 1990's.  
 Table 2 demonstrates how economic potential and autonomy do not correspond to 
one another. Although the three republics with the highest autonomy levels also have 
high economic potential, two republics with low autonomy, Karelia and Khakassia, have 
high economic potential. Among the republics with moderate autonomy, there are a 
variety of economic potential levels, with one "high" potential republic, three "moderate" 
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level republics, and three "low" potential republics. Economic potential or natural 
resources alone did not lead to the levels of autonomy achieved by the Russian republics.  
 
Table 3. External Borders227 
Republic Name Borders Federal District Level of Autonomy 
Bashkortostan Internal Volga High 
Sakha (Yakutia) External Far Eastern High 
Tatarstan Internal Volga High 
Buryatia External Siberian Moderate 
Chuvashia Internal Volga Moderate 
Kabardino-Balkaria External Southern Moderate 
Komi Internal North Western Moderate 
Mari El Internal Volga Moderate 
North Ossetia External Southern Moderate 
Udmurtia Internal Volga Moderate 
Adygeya Internal Southern Low 
Altai External Siberian Low 
Chechnya External Southern Low 
Dagestan External Southern Low 
Ingushetia External Southern Low 
Kalmykia External Southern Low 
Karachay-Cherkessia External Southern Low 
Karelia External North Western Low 
Khakassia Internal Siberian Low 
Mordovia Internal Volga Low 
Tuva External Siberian Low 
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Table 4. Concentration of Titular Nationality228 
 
Republic Name Concentration of Titular 
Nationality in Republic* 
Level of Autonomy 
Bashkortostan Low (21.9%) High 
Sakha (Yakutia) Low (33.4%) High 
Tatarstan Moderate (48.5%) High 
Buryatia Low (24.0%) Moderate 
Chuvashia High (67.8%) Moderate 
Kabardino-Balkaria Moderate (57.6%) Moderate 
Komi Low (22.1%) Moderate 
Mari El Moderate (43.3%) Moderate 
North Ossetia Moderate (53.0%) Moderate 
Udmurtia Low (30.9%) Moderate 
Adygeya Low (22.1%) Low 
Altai Low (31.0%) Low 
Chechnya High (66.0%) Low 
Dagestan High (76.7%) Low 
Ingushetia High (74.5%) Low 
Kalmykia Moderate (45.4%) Low 
Karachay-Cherkessia Moderate (40.9%) Low 
Karelia Low (10.1%) Low 
Khakassia Low (11.1%) Low 
Mordovia Low (32.5%) Low 
Tuva High (64.3%) Low 
*based on 1989 census 
 
 An alternative explanation of the varying levels of autonomy between ethnic 
republics is the idea of legitimacy. This hypothesis posits that if a republic was less likely 
to be able to survive as an independent state, then Russia would not take its demands 
seriously. The less legitimate state (as defined by Toft) would therefore have less 
autonomy, since the incentive for Russia to make concessions would be low. In Toft's229 
explanation of this hypothesis, a republic with little legitimacy has a non-violent 
negotiation with the federal center, while a republic with greater legitimacy expects a 
higher degree of autonomy (often independence) and the negotiations devolve to 
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violence.  An ethnic region that is considered to have legitimacy as an independent state 
generally must have external borders and a large concentration of the titular nationality 
residing in its territory.  
 Based on an analysis of these characteristics, it is apparent that "legitimacy" had 
little effect on the level of autonomy of the Russian republics. One might expect that as a 
republic's concentration of its titular nationality increased, autonomy would increase as 
well. By this same reasoning, an external border would increase the level of autonomy. 
Tatarstan and Sakha have similarly high levels of autonomy, and in both the republics the 
titular nationality was not a majority. In Tuva, for instance, there is an external border 
and a convincing majority population of Tuvans, but the republic has achieved less 
autonomy than Sakha or Tatarstan.  
 The analysis of titular nationality population considers is categorized as such: 
Low ≤ 40%, 40% ≥ Moderate ≤ 60%, High ≥ 60%. Using these categories, it is 
demonstrated that the concentration of a titular nationality within a republic does not 
correspond to autonomy. Among the half (approximate) of the republics with the highest 
levels of autonomy, "high" or "moderate", 40% are the majority ethnic group in their 
region. Among the republics with "low" levels of autonomy, 45% are the majority ethnic 
group in the republic. These percentages being nearly equal, it can be assumed that 
population of the titular nationality alone did not lead to the level of autonomy achieved. 
Since demographics, economic potential, and borders alone do not correspond to 
autonomy levels, then a combination of factors is likely to be more explanatory.  
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Table 5. Trust and Authoritarianism 
 
Republic Name Trust Authoritarianism Level of Autonomy 
Bashkortostan Yes Yes  High 
Sakha (Yakutia) Yes Yes High 
Tatarstan Yes Yes High 
Buryatia Weakly Yes Yes  Moderate 
Chuvashia Yes  No  Moderate 
Kabardino-Balkaria Yes  Yes  Moderate 
Komi Yes  Weakly Yes Moderate 
Mari El Yes Yes  Moderate 
North Ossetia Yes   No  Moderate 
Udmurtia No Weakly Yes  Moderate 
Adygeya No Yes Low 
Altai  No   No  Low 
Chechnya No Yes Low 
Dagestan Yes No Low 
Ingushetia No  Yes Low 
Kalmykia No  Yes Low 
Karachay-Cherkessia No  Yes Low 
Karelia No  No Low 
Khakassia No  No Low 
Mordovia No  Yes Low 
Tuva No  Yes Low 
 
 This chapter has demonstrated that the level of autonomy achieved in Russia's 
twenty-one republics during the Post-Soviet period was not determined by economic 
potential, natural resources, region, and concentration of titular nationality or having 
external borders. That these important factors were not correlated with the level of 
autonomy indicates that a different mechanism leads to autonomy level. As explained in 
the earlier chapters of this thesis, the dynamics of trust and authoritarianism in Tatarstan 
resulted in a high level of autonomy. Analyzed across the other twenty republics, trust 
and authoritarianism, when present, lead to a higher level of autonomy than without. 
Among the republics with high levels of autonomy, all have strong authoritarian leaders 
during the negotiation period whose relationship with the federal leaders is characterized 
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by a high degree of mutual trust. In this way, the leaders on both sides can reduce their 
risk and have incentives to make the negotiation as amicable as possible.  
 Tatarstan, Sakha and Bashkortostan all achieved high autonomy through their 
bilateral treaties, and all had strong elements of trust between regional and federal elites, 
and regional authoritarianism. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are very similar as far as 
leadership and regime type. Bashkortostan's authoritarian leader, Murtaza Rakhimov, was 
the previous Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Bashkortostan prior to 1991, tightly 
controlled the republic's media and opposition groups, had close ties to Moscow elites 
and was well-known to President Yeltsin, with whom Rakhimov enjoyed a good 
relationship.230  
 When comparing the leadership of Sakha before and after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, the continuity is clear. Within Sakha, widespread ethnic discrimination 
against Russians, who are the majority in the republic, resulted in an overrepresentation 
of Yakuts. In the early 1990's, more than half of the 27 members of government were of 
Yakut ethnicity. At the same time, of the 335 regional and district administrators, 80% 
were Yakut or members of a non-Russian, native ethnic group. Approximately half of the 
members of government were former apparatchiks and the Sakha elite were open to 
bargaining with the federal elite.231  
 Trust and a friendly relationship between Sakha and Moscow improved greatly 
with Yeltsin's decree in 1994 denouncing the Stalin-era persecution of the Yakuts. At the 
same time, Yeltsin made good on his promise of increased sovereignty, and allowed 
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Sakha more control over its vast natural resources.232 Nikolayev and Yeltsin were said to 
have a close personal friendship. Of additional assistance was Nikolayev's friendship 
with Pavel Borodin who worked for Yeltsin and was in charge of the federal property 
holdings. This relationship undoubtedly assisted Nikolayev in securing the unprecedented 
republican control over natural resources.233  His personality was said to have contributed 
to his trusting relations with Moscow. Nikolayev made a positive impression with the 
Moscow elites, where he tended to voice support against reforms.234 
 During his tenure Nikolayev gained personal political control in the republic, and 
became one of the more influential republic leaders. He was called an "economic 
authoritarian" because he backed state regulation of the economy, arguing that it creates 
an atmosphere stimulating to growth and entrepreneurship. Diamonds allowed the Sakha 
government a great deal of leverage over regional and national politics, yet they did not 
benefit the Sakha population.235 The residents of Sakha are among the poorest in the 
Russian federation, even though the government regularly deals with foreign companies 
interested in purchasing the republic's lucrative natural resources. The government also 
controls the electoral process, which has been manipulated to keep the Russian 
population from increasing their representation in Sakha politics and to break term limits 
for the executive.236 
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 Republics characterized by moderate levels of autonomy generally have degrees 
of trust and authoritarianism, but they are weaker than those present in the highly 
autonomous republics.   
 Kabardino-Balkaria has a moderate level of autonomy due to trust and 
authoritarianism that, was generally weaker than in Tatarstan, Sakha and Bashkortostan. 
The republic's elites were constant through the post-soviet transition, adding to the level 
of trust between regional and federal leaders.237 Longtime President, Valerii Kokov, was 
the leader since before the fall of the Soviet Union, having served as Chairman of the 
republic's Supreme Soviet.238 He ran unopposed in 1996 and was elected to his 3rd term in 
2002 with 87% of the votes.239 He was authoritarian, but primarily through election 
fraud,240 and thus the regime overall was less controlling than other republics.  
 Mari El is similar to Kabardino-Balkaria, in the fact that it also had elite trust with 
Moscow and an authoritarian President. The power-sharing treaty was signed in 1998 
under the regime of authoritarian leader Vyacheslav Aleksandovich Kislitsyn. He was 
accused of the misuse of the republic's funds, appointing officials who had criminal 
records, and limiting freedoms within the republic.241 Kislitsyn formerly served in the 
Russian Federation Council in 1993-1997, so he was a Moscow insider, having attended 
graduate school in the capital as well. He joined the Our Home is Russia Party in 1997 in 
order to garner more favor with Yeltsin.242 Kislitsyn's insider status paid off in the form 
of the regime generally being left alone by the federal government. In 1999 this fact was 
                                                      
237
 Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia, 380. 
238
 Liz Fuller, "Kabardino-Balkaria: President's Premature Resignation Highlights Republic's Problems," 
RFE/RL Newsline 19 September 2005. 
239
  Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia, 380. 
240
 Hahn, Russia's Islamic Threat, 146. 
241
 EastWest Institute Russian Regional Report 5, no. 45 (6 December 2000). 
242
 Orttung, Lussier and Paretskaya, The Republics and Regions of the Russian Federation: A Guide to 
Politics, Policies, and Leaders, 326. 
 93 
 
obvious, when Kislitsyn tried to sell Russian missile defense system classified technology 
to the Kuwaiti government, and was not prosecuted.243  
 Komi's moderate level of autonomy is characterized by trust between the regional 
and federal elites, and weak authoritarianism. The republic could be characterized as 
semi-authoritarian because the government lacked a true separation of powers, but had 
real competition for leadership. At the fall of the Soviet Union, Yurii Spiridonov, a 
Russian, chaired the Komi Supreme Soviet, and Vyacheslav Khudyaev, of Komi 
ethnicity, chaired the Council of Ministers.244 They remained in power through the 
immediate transition and in 1993 split over the Russian Constitution. Spiridonov was 
ultimately elected. During his tenure, the continuity of power was very prevalent due to 
his experience in the Soviet system and the 30% of city or district administrators who 
were elected to the republican legislature. This continuity increased trust, and the 
authoritarian character of the regime was encouraged by the non-existent separation of 
powers.245  
 Buryatia is somewhat similar to Komi, as both republics have degrees of trust and 
authoritarianism, but one is weaker than the other. Leonid Potapov, former Chairman of 
the Supreme Soviet became the first president and led an authoritarian regime. He 
restricted freedom of the media, manipulated elections, and strong-armed his 
legislature.246 Potapov claimed that his relationship with Moscow was good, but 
observers have characterized it as nothing extraordinary.247  
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 Chuvashia and North Ossetia are very similar to one another, both having trust 
and no authoritarianism in their republics during the negotiation period. North Ossetia's 
leader, Akhsarbeck Galazov had a good relationship with Moscow248 and was not 
authoritarian. Nikolai Fedorov of Chuvashia, worked under Yeltsin as a justice minister 
in the early 1990's, but broke with him over the decision to use force against parliament 
in 1993.249 This shows that there was trust, since they did have an actual personal 
relationship at one time, which is arguably more advantageous than to have no 
relationship at all. Fedorov was not an authoritarian leader, as evinced by the republic's 
1997 competitive elections. In this 1997 race, Fedorov won with 56.5% over his 
opponent, who garnered 35% of the vote.250  
 Udmurtia was different from most republics, because it did not have trust and was 
a weak authoritarian regime. In 1996 the parliament was accused of suffocating the local 
government to the point that it was declared illegal, though in general it was not 
considered very authoritarian.251 As of 1999 the republic had not voted to create the 
position of President. Therefore, prior to his election, as the republic's first president, 
Alexander Volkov served as Chairman of the Republic's council. Yeltsin and he did not 
have a strong relationship and in fact in 1997, Yeltsin threatened to dismiss Volkov.252  
 The republics found to have low levels of autonomy are generally lacking in 
either trust, authoritarianism, or both. Of the republics characterized by low autonomy, 
Karelia, the Altai Republic and Khakassia have neither elite trust nor regional 
authoritarianism. Dagestan is characterized by a trusting relationship with Moscow but is 
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not a very liberal regime. By far, most of the republics which have a low level of 
autonomy are authoritarian but do not have the trust of the federal leadership. These 
republics include Kalmykia, Ingushetia, Mordovia, Adygeya, Karachay-Cherkessia, Tuva 
and Chechnya.  
 Viktor Stepanov, the President of Karelia, was outspoken in favor of 
decentralization of the Russian Federation, which ran counter to the interests of the 
Kremlin, whose incentive was to keep the regional governments as under control as 
possible. This demonstrates that there was low trust, since Stepanov made himself such 
an outspoken critic of a highly centralized federation.  In May 1998, incumbent Stepanov 
lost reelection, a clear sign that Karelia was not an authoritarian regime, which tends to 
enable incumbents to win elections (because they are rarely free or fair).253 Despite the 
competitive elections, the upper chamber of the legislature was created specifically for 
the district and city administrators to serve in, recycling the government personnel in 
such a way that it reduced the ability of the branches to check one another.254  
 Similarly, in the Altai Republic, elite continuity through the post-Soviet transition 
was strong, and the leaders remained closely tied with the Russian government. The 
government was not authoritarian because the leaders had competitive elections, electing 
a new president nearly every four years.  Turnover in the executive contributed to the low 
level of trust between the republican and federal elites.255 
 The Republic of Dagestan, in the 1990's, had a trusting relationship with federal 
elites. The government tried an experiment to represent each ethnic group in the 
legislature, not like the authoritarianism in other republics. An unintended consequence 
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was that as of 1999 there was actually no position of President of the Republic, although 
referenda were held three times, in 1991, 1993 and 1999. Ethnic tensions led the voters to 
fear putting power into the hands of a single executive.256 Magomedali Magomedovich 
Magomedov, longtime leader of Dagestan, was the Chairman of the republican state 
council and served as the executive leader, since there was no president, from before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin called Magomedov on the eve of his 1998 election 
to express support, which indicates that there was trust between the leaders. This trust 
was pragmatic, because Russia needed an ally in the war-torn Caucasus and Dagestan 
needed the support of the Russian state in order to remain stable.257 
 Most of the republics had authoritarian regimes but lacked a trusting relationship 
with the leadership of the Russian Federation, preventing them from successfully 
negotiating; a consequence that is very pronounced for those republics with low 
autonomy levels. 
 In Kalmykia, the republic's government was highly authoritarian, but encouraged 
no trust from the federal government. In general, the Kalmykian President's 
authoritarianism was by using the population to support his whims. For example, in 1998, 
the regime needed to furnish empty houses in his "Chess City" for an inaugural 
tournament. The impoverished residents were told to lend their kitchenware, refrigerators 
and televisions for the duration of the competition.258 Regarding the republic's media, an 
opposition paper, Sovietskaya Kalmykia existed but was printed with such great secrecy 
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that the press was located in a neighboring republic.259 President Ilyumzhinov has said 
that he personally relates to and admires dictatorial leaders, describing himself as a 
combination of Napoleon, Lenin, de Gaulle and Marx.260 Under these conditions, no trust 
could develop with the federal elites because of Ilyumzhinov's unprecedented 
irrationality. The 1994 abolition of the republic's own constitution demonstrated this 
irrationality very clearly, in addition to Ilyumzhinov's claims about extraterrestrials and 
aspirations for his republic to be the Chess capital of the world.261. A bargaining partner 
as irrational and erratic as the Kalmkian President could not be trusted to keep to his 
word. Furthermore, he took actions that were contrary to his own requests for autonomy. 
On one hand, Ilyumzhinov asserted legal supremacy of republican law over federal law, 
then changed positions completely, not just declaring federal legal supremacy over his 
republic, but abolishing his entire constitution.  When Ilyumzhinov did this, it was clear 
that the President was unstable and nothing he said or did could be trusted. This is the 
most extreme case of authoritarianism in the Russian federation, but the general theme of 
a Soviet-era dictator is common in the republics.  
 The Adygeyan republic's leadership was generally the same group of people from 
the Soviet government through the transition to the Russian Federation. The first 
President was Aslan Aliyevich Dzharimov, former Secretary of Krasnodar Region Party 
Committee, who became Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Adygeya, in 1989 and was 
elected President of the Republic in January 1992. Trust between the regional and federal 
elites was not strong, as evidenced by the federal government's interference in Adgyghe 
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affairs. The Adgyhe do not have a high level of trust for the federal elites because of this 
interference, and the threat to dissolve the republic into Krasnodar is an ever-present 
possibility. The government of Adygeya does exert some aspects of authoritarian control, 
but the strong Russian presence means that there is a large opposition which enjoys 
national support and makes it difficult for the Adygeyan administration to enforce its will 
without public support.262 
 The first president of Karachay-Cherkessia, Vladimir Khubiyev, was the 
republic's former Communist party leader who took over as executive of the republic in 
the early 1990's. At this time the republic was so unstable that the federal government 
could not trust that Kubiyev would be able to uphold his end of any agreements that were 
made. Observers assessed that he would only remain in control as long as he prevented 
violence.263 Under these conditions, the republic was authoritarian, but was unable to 
develop trust with the federal government in order to negotiate for autonomy.264  
 Mordovian President Nikolai Merkushkin was authoritarian, and was accused of 
manipulating election laws to win reelection in 1998 with 96.6% of the votes. He 
achieved this, allegedly, through the legislature disqualifying all his viable opponents.265 
There was not much trust between Merkushkin and federal elites, as he was not a former 
apparatchik like most of the regional executives. 
 Ruslan Aushev, president of Ingushetia during most of the 1990's infuriated 
Moscow by criticizing the war in Chechnya and resulted in a low level of trust, so low 
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that he was even thrown out of the capital itself.266 Aushev's regime was authoritarian, 
and tried to institute sharia (Islamic law), and successfully manipulated election laws.267  
 In Tuva, President Sherig-ool Oorzhak, was a former apparatchik and 
authoritarian leader.268 Howevere, his authoritarian control was not enough to overcome 
the nationalist movement enough to avoid violence and encourage trust between the 
republican and federal elites. A fact that exacerbated this was that Tuva's Chair of 
Parliament was the head of a nationalist organization.269  Furthermore, Tuva was 
incorporated into the USSR in 1944, so compared to other republics, Tuvan elites had 
much less time to develop contacts and networks in Moscow.270  
 Chechnya, under Dzhokhar Dudaev, was clearly an authoritarian leader without a 
trusting relationship with the Russian leadership. Anecdotal evidence indicates that a 
personal dislike prevented President Yeltsin and Dudaev from negotiations over a 
bilateral treaty, even in periods of relative calm.271 The Chechen government is not 
generally referred to as "authoritarian," but regardless of the terminology used, the 
regime in Chechnya has for decades controlled all aspects of life in the republic. For the 
purposes of assessing this trust-authoritarianism hypothesis, Chechnya during the past 
two decades of instability, has all the characteristics present to be considered an 
authoritarian republic.  
 As seen in Table 4, when a republic's government has a trusting relationship with 
the federal elites, it is able to engage in negotiations with the advantage of a crony 
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relationship with the federal elites. However, if that republic's government does not also 
have control over the media, political institutions and freedom of speech in its republic, 
then it will not have the stability bargaining chip. In 1994-1998 period of transition and 
autonomy negotiation under President Yeltsin, the Kremlin placed a premium on 
stability. A republican leader who could ensure stability (from ethnic nationalism, 
primarily), could convince Moscow to give up much more in terms of the republic's 
autonomy. Similarly, a republican leadership with authoritarian control over opposition 
within its borders but who could not be trusted to adhere to the terms of an agreement 
would also not be able to get much by way of autonomy concessions from Moscow. This 
analysis has demonstrated among the republics of the Russian Federation, trust between 
regional and federal elites, coupled with authoritarian control within the regions, is a 
determinant of the amount of autonomy that a republic can achieve within the Russian 
Federation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 TRUSTING AUTOCRATS? 
 
 Tatarstan, a semi-autonomous republic of the Russian Federation, is regularly 
cited as an example of a peaceful resolution to a potentially violent ethnic separatist 
situation. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, ethnic groups such as Tatars and 
Chechens began to demand independence. Out of this cacophony of autonomy demands, 
Tatarstan emerged with perhaps the highest level of autonomy of Russia’s 21 ethnic 
republics. Oft-cited explanations of this result include the nature of the Tatar people and 
the geography or natural resources of Tatarstan. While these are important factors in 
understanding the process by which autonomy was achieved, the reality of post-Soviet 
politics must be considered. This thesis argues that Tatarstan negotiated a relatively high 
amount of independence through elite trust and regional authoritarianism. Leaders at the 
republic and federal level had a relationship that can be characterized as trusting: being 
able to rely on the other's adherence to agreements, non-adversarial behavior, 
predictability and competency. The unique position of the Tatar leadership allowed them 
to maximize their autonomy by being seen as an ally of Moscow, having insider 
experience with the Russian legal system, and by using President Shaimiev's 
authoritarianism as a bargaining chip. The control exercised by Shaimiev's regime over 
Tatarstan was a tool used by the republic’s leadership to apply pressure to the federal 
authorities during a period when Moscow feared the unraveling of the fragile Russian 
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Federation. Authoritarianism under Shaimiev featured repression of nationalist dissent 
and control of political institutions at all levels of government. Elite trust and regional 
authoritarianism acted upon each other to keep the balance of incentives for both 
Tatarstan and Russia. As an authoritarian regime, the Tatar government wanted to remain 
in power and manipulated opposition groups to demonstrate its ability to keep order in 
the region. The Russian government, wanting calm in its ethnic regions, valued the 
stability of the Shaimiev regime, which it perceived as more reasonable other ethnic 
regions, due to shared values and experiences. In this way, trust and authoritarianism, 
were integral to the level of autonomy that Tatarstan achieved in the post-Soviet 
autonomy negotiations.  
 
THE FUTURE OF RUSSIA’S ETHNIC REPUBLICS 
 One could argue that authoritarian control through unstable times is a natural and 
helpful stage in a transition from a centralized, controlled system such as the Soviet 
System to a free and open democracy. Authoritarian control provides stability and 
enables the government to make the necessary changes, such as the transition from a 
centrally-planned to market economy, without the hassle of democratic processes. It is 
certainly true that Russia's transition since 1991 has been characterized by authoritarian 
practices, much of which may be due to the persistence of Soviet-era leadership. These 
leaders maintain their connections and result in a government that is not transparent, is 
not welcoming to outsiders, and is not equitable. Still, the government has tended to be 
stable. As described in this thesis, the stability precipitated by the elite trust and regional 
authoritarianism combination is based on personalities. In the case of Tatarstan, the 
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stability and prosperity of the republic is largely due to the influence of Mintimer 
Shaimiev. Unfortunately, this type of stability is bound to come to an end, and this begs 
the question, what happens when these former Soviet leaders are no longer in power? 
 Shaimiev is a member of an illustrious "class" of former Soviet apparatchiks who 
are currently presiding over many of the Russian republics and the former Soviet States. 
This "class roster" includes such names as Nursultan Nazarbayev, and Islam Karimov, 
the current Presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, respectively. Their class is only a 
decade from reaching retirement and soon the next generation will take the reins. For 
policy and the study of political transitions, it will be a significant event when the 
"Shaimievs" leave their Kremlins and parliament buildings for the sunny shores of the 
Crimean or Lake Baikal.  
 For a glance into the future, one can look into the past. Unfortunately, the 
members of Shaimiev's "class" who have already left office also left behind a mixed bag 
of stability and instability in their wake. For example, Kyrgyz President Askra Akayev 
was forced out of office after years of increasingly heavy authoritarianism. This "Tulip 
Revolution" could potentially be repeated across Russia in the many authoritarian ethnic 
republics. On the other hand, there is the uneventful transition that took place in 
Turkmenistan with the death of Turkmenbashi, one of the most authoritarian leaders in 
the "class." Analysts were concerned that a power vacuum caused by the retirement or 
death of Turkmenbashi would result in a revolution, but the transition was the opposite.  
 It is most likely that as the members of Shaimiev's "class" leave office, that there 
will be a mixture of peaceful and turbulent transitions. This change will then usher in a 
new "class" of leaders. This group will not have such strong "apparatchik bonds", and 
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this new group of leaders will probably test the strength of Russian federal asymmetry. 
With any luck, they will forge a new, equitable and stable model of autonomy. 
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